

Educating for Personal and Social Responsibility:
A Planning Project of the Association of American Colleges and Universities

Review of the Literature

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	4
Part I: Toward a Shared Definition.....	6
Cognitive-Structural Perspectives.....	7
Perspectives from Domain Theory.....	20
Affective Perspectives.....	22
Social Learning Perspectives.....	25
Integrative Perspectives.....	31
Toward a Shared Definition: Future Directions.....	36
Part II: Educating for Responsibility.....	40
What Happens in College?	40
Moral Reasoning.....	41
Moral Behavior.....	44
Moral Values.....	47
Other Dimensions, Future Directions.....	48
Is It Our Business?	49
Educating from the Five Perspectives.....	52
Cognitive-Structural Perspectives.....	53
Domain Perspectives.....	58
Affective Perspectives.....	59
Social Learning Perspectives.....	62
Integrative Perspectives.....	65
Educating for Responsibility: Future Directions.....	70
Part III: Assessing Value Added.....	73
Cognitive-Structural Measurements.....	73

Moral Judgment Interview (MJI).....	74
Defining Issues Test (DIT).....	75
Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF).....	76
Ethic of Care Interview (ECI).....	76
Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO).....	77
Measure of Intellectual Development (MID).....	77
Learning Environment Preferences (LEP).....	78
Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI).....	79
Sentence Completion Test (SCT).....	80
Student Developmental Task and Lifestyle Assessment (SDTLA)....	81
Instruments from Other Perspectives.....	82
Assessment of Affect.....	82
Values-Based Assessments.....	85
Behavioral Assessments.....	87
Personality, Style, and Interest Assessments.....	88
Limitations of Existing Instruments.....	88
Assessing Value Added: Future Directions.....	91
A Multidimensional Approach.....	92
A Multicontextual Approach.....	95
A Multimodal Approach.....	96
Conclusion: Future Directions for Research.....	100
References.....	104

Introduction

At the turn of the millennium, the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) convened a national panel of scholars, educators, policymakers, and business and community leaders to ask fundamental questions about higher education in the United States. The panel's report, *Greater Expectations: A New Vision for Learning as a Nation Goes to College* (2002), called for the "kind of learning students need to meet emerging challenges in the workplace, in a diverse democracy, and in an interconnected world" (vii). To this end, a principal recommendation of the report was that higher education engage in developing "responsible" learners whose "sense of social responsibility and ethical judgment" (xii) is marked by such qualities as "intellectual honesty," "responsibility for society's moral health and for social justice," and "discernment of consequences, including ethical consequences" of decisions and actions (24).

In considering this call for higher education to foster learning in the domain of personal and social responsibility, the present report has two purposes. The first is to ask what might be helpful from relevant literature and research in conceptualizing and framing this domain; in other words, what do we already know about personal and social responsibility? The second purpose is to identify unanswered questions arising out of the literature that might be explored through systematic, longitudinal study; in other words, what do we need to know about personal and social responsibility, and how might we go about discovering it? With these goals in mind, this report discusses the following three key areas, or themes, of inquiry:

- I. *Toward a Shared Definition.* Given the wide range of disciplinary approaches,

conceptual frameworks, and disparate terminology for describing personal and social responsibility, how might the higher education community come to collectively and collaboratively define this domain?

II. *Educating for Responsibility*. Does growth and learning in the area of personal and social responsibility occur in higher education settings? If so, how might colleges and universities enhance personal and social responsibility through various efforts, including curriculum and pedagogy?

III. *Assessing Value Added*. How might the value added of higher education in the realm of developing personal and social responsibility be assessed? What guiding principles, as well as specific instrumentation, might prove fruitful to this end?

These themes of inquiry are addressed in this report through a focused review of what extant literature reveals about each theme and through a discussion of the implications of the literature—including promising leads for future work—for each theme. This report concludes with a description of promising directions for future research on personal and social responsibility at the college level.

I. Toward a Shared Definition

Nucci (2001) states, “At the core of current controversies is how we are going to define what we mean by morality” (xvii). Indeed, a cursory look at the literature shows that many authors begin by questioning the meaning of terms such as morality, responsibility, values, integrity, moral development, moral reasoning, moral education, and character education. In *Educating Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic Responsibility*, Colby et al. (2003) assert, “Before going further we need to address the question: What do we mean by moral and civic education? What is it that we are calling for?” (11). Nash (1997) asks questions about character education, such as “What exactly is virtue, and how do we become virtuous people?” (9). Fine (1995), in discussing “moral and social responsibility initiatives” in schools, asks, “What values are to be deemed positive? By whose authority are they to be promoted?” (8). Extending this discussion to the realm of higher education, Morrill (1980) asks, “In a pluralistic society, whose values and which morality and ethics are to be taught?” (12). And Gibbs (2003) offers a succinct but apt description of the terrain: “Morality is rife with issues” (3).

On the surface, there is a problem of common terminology in discussing the meaning and nature of personal and social responsibility. Rather than an issue of semantics, however, the various terminologies are reflective of distinct moral “languages” (Nash 1997) that arise from different theoretical perspectives. The first step toward a shared definition of personal and social responsibility, then, must necessarily involve some understanding of these different languages or perspectives and their relationships with one another. Five key languages considered in this

review are those of cognitive-structural, domain, affective, social learning, and integrative perspectives.

Cognitive-Structural Perspectives

Cognitive-structural theories of moral development comprise the predominant conceptual framework in the literature for describing personal and social responsibility. Major assumptions of this body of theory are as follows: the moral dimension of self develops over the lifespan; moral development is primarily cognitive in nature and therefore centers in processes such as moral reasoning or judging; development can be traced through progressive stages in the direction of increasing complexity; and development occurs in global schemas and processes of thinking, and therefore is independent of the specific content of an individual's belief system. The major models of development arising from this theoretical stance include those of Kohlberg (1984), Gilligan (1982), Perry (1999), Belenky et al. (1997), King and Kitchener (1994), Loevinger (1976), and Chickering (Chickering and Reisser 1993).

Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) state that for research on the "influence of college on moral development . . . the dominant theoretical framework that guides this inquiry has been that of Lawrence Kohlberg" (336). Kohlberg's work, which initially aimed to expand Piaget's studies of the moral development of children into the adolescent years, posited that individuals advance through six invariant stages of moral development as their moral reasoning capacities become more complex. Kohlberg's theory assumes that this development occurs independently from specific beliefs or value systems, and is therefore "culturally universal" (Blatt and Kohlberg 1975, 129).

Although Kohlberg's work has endured much revision as well as critique, the central

element of his theory is the six-stage scheme—organized into three levels of development—charting growth in individuals’ moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1984). In the first level, preconventional reasoning, the focus of moral reasoning is the self, with little regard to or understanding of societal rules and dynamics. In Stage 1, Heteronomous Morality, children understand actions in absolute terms as either good or bad; moral judgment in this stage centers on obedience and the avoidance of wrong behavior and subsequent punishment. In Stage 2—Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange—children define right behavior as that which meets the needs of the individual; when the needs of the self come into conflict with those of others, reciprocal behavior and fair exchanges become the focus of moral reasoning.

In the second, or conventional, level of moral reasoning, an awareness of community norms, expectations, and rules grows, as does the individual’s understanding of the self as part of a larger society. In Stage 3—Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity—children strive to be accepted as “good” by the larger society through living in congruence with others’ expectations and attempting to please those closest to them, especially authorities. Stage 4, Social System and Conscience, marks the beginning of the mature moral reasoning that is more typical of progression into and through adulthood. In this orientation, individuals come to understand the need for a social system with consistent laws as well as the individual’s responsibility in upholding the order created by this system.

In the third or postconventional level of moral reasoning, the individual develops a complex set of moral principles that transcend both individual needs (the focus of preconventional reasoning) and social order (the focus of conventional reasoning). In Stage 5, Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights, individuals begin to recognize the existence of fundamental human values and rights that preexist—and therefore sometimes supersede—the

prevailing legal system. Moral action in this stage respects these universal rights and promotes the welfare of the majority. In Stage 6, Universal Ethical Principles, moral principles such as those of “justice, of reciprocity and equality of human action, of universal respect for human rights and for human personality” (Blatt and Kohlberg 1975, 130) are applied in logical and consistent ways to decide moral dilemmas and dictate moral action. In Kohlberg’s and others’ research, these final two stages were not typically evident among adolescents and were rarely identified even among adults. Specifically, in later research on the model, all adults who were found to have reached Stage 5 had participated in graduate education, and those who reached Stage 6 had received formal training in philosophy (Gibbs 2003).

Although subsequent studies based on Kohlberg’s theory incorporated women as well as people from various racial, cultural, and national backgrounds, the initial research from which the theory was developed was conducted with white male participants. Questions therefore have arisen in the literature about how Kohlberg’s scheme might—or might not—account for different developmental paths and ways of moral reasoning when viewed from gendered and multicultural perspectives. In considering the former, Carol Gilligan’s *In a Different Voice* (1982), along with her other works on women’s experiences, provide a critique and an additional scheme through which to conceptualize moral development.

In her research with both women and men, Gilligan (1982) identifies two perspectives, or “voices,” from which participants seem to speak of their moral reasoning and actions. Gilligan describes one voice, that of “justice”—or an emphasis on autonomy, rights and rules—to be more descriptive of men’s ways of thinking and acting in moral situations. Gilligan found that women, however, tended to demonstrate the voice of “care”—or a value of human relationship and connection—more often in their experiences of moral reasoning. These two “voices” are

also described as “ethics,” or guiding principles for moral reasoning and action.

The ethic of care is the focus of Gilligan’s (1977) developmental sequence, which she believes to be more fully descriptive of women’s development of moral reasoning. The sequence is comprised of three levels, with two transition periods between these levels; each level is characterized by increasing complexity in the individual’s understanding of the relationship between the self and others, while the transitions are characterized by increasing complexity in the individual’s conceptualization of selfishness and responsibility. In the first level, Orientation to Individual Survival, moral reasoning and decision making center on efforts to meet the individual’s needs in order to preserve the self. The first transition in Gilligan’s model, From Selfishness to Responsibility, occurs when a conflict arises between the need to take care of one’s self and the need to take care of others; during this transition, judging moral issues becomes a question more of connection with others than independence. In the next level, Goodness as Self-Sacrifice, achieving acceptance by and connection with others becomes a primary goal, and taking care of the needs of others—often to the neglect of the individual’s needs—is preeminent. The next transition, From Goodness to Truth, involves the individual’s calling into question this subordination of the needs of self to the needs of others; meeting both sets of needs is eventually seen as the responsible way to make decisions and to act morally. In the third and final level, The Morality of Nonviolence, the individual uses the principle of avoiding hurt to both self and others as a guide for moral reasoning. The dualism of self and others disappears in this developmental level, thereby allowing the individual to think more complexly about moral choices and actions.

Although both Kohlberg’s work was later extended to examine moral development in young adults, and Gilligan’s work was partially based on the experiences of college students,

Perry was the first to directly study development during the college years. Perry (1999) explains that his developmental scheme provides a framework for conceptualizing “in developmental terms, abstract structural aspects of knowing and valuing in intelligent late-adolescents” (16). Instead of invariant stages, Perry envisioned nine developmental “positions” that “can express the locus of a central tendency or dominance” (54) in a student’s thinking and valuing. Through these positions, a developmental process unfolds by which students become more willing and able to incorporate and synthesize multiple ideas, perspectives, and interpretations, which in turn results in an increased capacity in students for complex thought.

The nine positions of Perry’s scheme of ethical and intellectual development are grouped into three segments, each consisting of three positions, which show a general “development from a dualistic absolutism and toward this acceptance of generalized relativism” (64). According to Perry, in the first three positions “a person modifies an absolutistic right-wrong outlook to make room, in some minimal way, for that simple pluralism we have called Multiplicity” (65). In the next three positions “a person accords the diversity of human outlook its full problematic stature, next transmutes the simple pluralism of Multiplicity into contextual Relativism” (65), while in the final three positions the individual develops specific value-based commitments.

As a result of subsequent research on and application of the Perry scheme, Knefelkamp (1999) asserts that Positions 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Dualism, Early Multiplicity, Late Multiplicity, and Contextual Relativism, respectively) are most salient for examining development in the college years. Knefelkamp and Cornfeld (1979) provide the following detailed analysis of each of these four positions. In Position 2, Dualism, students believe all knowledge is known, and that a definite “right” and “wrong” exist. As authorities are absolute and are the source of all knowledge, students are particularly challenged by ambiguity and requests for their personal

opinion or interpretation. In Position 3, Early Multiplicity, students believe that most knowledge is known; if something is not known, it is still knowable, and will be discovered if the correct process or right way is used to find the answers. Authorities demonstrate the right way to find knowledge, and the student's role is to follow the right processes to acquire the correct knowledge. Students are challenged by determining what is true out of multiple perspectives they encounter. In Position 4, Late Multiplicity, students believe that in some areas knowledge can be certain, but most things aren't known for sure. In other words, students are certain that nothing is certain. They believe all opinions are equally valid and invalid, and, therefore, people should do as they individually see fit. Learning is often seen as a game, in which instructors model the ways in which they want students to think. The role of the student is to think for oneself, and individualism is valued. Finally, in Position 5, Contextual Relativism, students believe all knowledge is contextual and disconnected from any notion of absolute truth. "Right" and "wrong" do exist, but are contextual and judged by "rules of adequacy," which are determined by sound thought processes. Students will often seek out a diversity of opinions and experiences of others. Cognitively, students are comfortable with shifting from context to context, applying rules of adequacy in each learning situation. They are capable of seeing complexity and are comfortable with abstraction, but making a commitment amid multiple valid alternatives is problematic.

While students tend to progress along this continuum of developmental positions, Perry (1999) explains that movement is not automatic. Students can opt for three "alternatives" to growth in "positions of deflection" (65): temporizing, or pausing growth for a year or longer; escape, or settling for a later position but denying its implications for growth; and retreat, or returning to earlier positions of development. Individuals can, however, emerge from these

alternatives and resume the growth and maturation process.

As Perry's model was primarily developed through research with male students, Belenky et al. (1997) sought to expand his theoretical work by exploring the ways in which women uniquely think about their own knowledge. In *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind*, the authors developed "reconstructions of the Perry positions" (xiv) that seemed to be more fully descriptive of women's experiences in knowing. These reconstructions are represented in the following "five different perspectives from which women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority" (3): Silence, Received Knowledge, Subjective Knowledge, Procedural Knowledge, and Constructed Knowing.

The first two perspectives of knowing are characterized by an external definition of self and a reliance on outside authorities as the source for moral direction. The first perspective of Silence entails "an extreme in denial of self and in dependence on external authority for direction" (25). In this perspective, women are incapable of "representational thought" and therefore are "isolated from others"—moreover, "without tools for representing their experiences, people also remain isolated from self" (25-26). Authorities are seen as all-knowing and all-powerful. The authors equate the second perspective of Received Knowledge with Perry's position of Dualism, in that "things are right or wrong, true or false, good or bad, black or white" (37). Received knowers view themselves as being capable of repeating knowledge communicated by external authorities, but are incapable of independent knowledge or thought. They rely on others even for self-knowledge, and often believe they "should devote themselves to the care and empowerment of others while remaining 'selfless'" (46). As in the Perry scheme, women in this perspective often have difficulty dealing with ambiguity.

The next two perspectives involve a shift from external to internal ways of knowing and valuing. In the perspective of Subjective Knowledge, the authors see women as conceiving “truth as personal, private, and subjectively known or intuited” (54). While this perspective still retains dualistic qualities in that absolute right and wrong exist, “the fountain of truth simply has shifted locale. Truth now resides within the person and can negate answers that the outside world supplies” (54). In this perspective, women “become their own authorities” and are capable of “self-definition” (54). In the fourth perspective, or Procedural Knowing, women view learning as being based on identifiable procedures and rules which they must learn and utilize to gain knowledge. In this perspective, women either see the knowledge as impersonal and logical (separate knowing) or personal and empathetic (connected knowing). The authors compare separate knowing to the Perry scheme’s position of Late Multiplicity, as women use reason to “construct arguments powerful enough to meet the standards of an impersonal authority” (101). In contrast, in connected knowing, women employ a mode of thinking that “emerges” out of “a need to understand the opinions of other people” (101).

In the final perspective, Constructed Knowing, women view themselves as the creators of knowledge, which itself is viewed as being contextual. The authors explain that for women, this perspective “began as an effort to reclaim the self by attempting to *integrate* knowledge that they felt intuitively was personally important with knowledge they had learned from others” (134). In this integrative perspective, a “weaving together” of reason and emotion, and “objective and subjective knowing,” occurs (134). Women who achieved this perspective, according to the authors, all experienced “a period of intense self-reflection and self-analysis” (135), and exhibited a passion for learning, a tendency to constantly pose questions, and an overall moral consistency in their thinking.

Kitchener and King (1990), whose work has its theoretical grounding in that of Perry and Belenky et al., developed the Reflective Judgment Model through longitudinal studies of undergraduate and graduate students as well as adults not involved in formal education. King and Kitchener (1994) describe individuals as having a “lens” constructed of “assumptions about what and how something can be known” which, in turn, “shapes how individuals frame a problem and how they justify their beliefs about it in the face of uncertainty” (xvi). By categorizing the different lenses people employ on a developmental continuum, the Reflective Judgment Model “describes a developmental process . . . in the ways that people understand the process of knowing and in the corresponding ways that they justify their beliefs about ill-structured problems” (13).

King and Kitchener (1994) describe “seven distinct sets of epistemic assumptions and concepts of justification” (xvi) which are organized into three major groupings: Pre-Reflective Thinking, Quasi-Reflective Thinking, and Reflective Thinking. These groupings bear similarities to Perry’s positions of Dualism, Multiplicity, and Contextual Relativism, respectively. In Pre-Reflective Thinking, which encompasses the first three stages of the model, “knowledge is gained either by direct, personal observation or through the word of an authority figure; they assume that knowledge thus gained is absolutely correct and certain” (16). In Quasi-Reflective Thinking, which is comprised of the fourth and fifth stages, students recognize that “knowledge claims about ill-structured problems contain elements of uncertainty . . . [but] they are often at a loss when asked to solve ill-structured problems because they don’t know how to deal with the inherent ambiguity of such problems” (16). In Reflective Thinking, which spans the last two and most advanced stages of the model, students realize that “one’s understanding of the world is not “given” but must be actively constructed and that knowledge must be understood in relationship

to the context in which it was generated” (17). Individuals who are reflective thinkers assume that “some interpretations or knowledge claims may be judged as more plausible than others. Thus, while absolute truth will never be ascertained with complete certainty, some views may be evaluated as more reasonable explanations” (17). As in Perry’s rules of adequacy employed by relativistic thinkers, criteria for evaluation are used in these stages of the Reflective Judgment model; King and Kitchener describe these criteria as including “conceptual soundness, coherence, degree of fit with the data, meaningfulness, usefulness, and parsimony” (17). In their research, Kitchener and King (1990) found that Reflective Thinking “is a rarity even in graduate students” (166), but that later meaning perspectives are more likely to develop in the adult years and are usually “tied to participation in advanced education when individuals are involved in the creation of knowledge” (173-74).

Loevinger (1976) proposed a model of ego development that delineates a series of increasingly complex stages from which individuals perceive the self and the world and, as a result, from which they interact with the world. Loevinger describes her theory as mapping the “course of character development within individuals” (3). As such, ego is viewed as being a distinct developmental concept but at the same time correlating with the development of other cognitive capacities, such as thinking, moral reasoning, and judgment. Loevinger’s ten stages of ego development are based on developmental milestones that can occur during a wide range of ages, and an assumption of the model is that progression to a more complex level requires attainment of previous levels. Each level is characterized by the variables of impulse control and character development, interpersonal style, conscious preoccupations, and cognitive style.

In the first of level of ego development, Presocial and Symbiotic, the infant initially does not differentiate between self and others, but then develops a strong relationship with the

primary caregiver who is differentiated from the environment. During the Impulse level, a separate identity is established but the need for others is still high; as implied in this level's name, children demand that adults meet their impulses and satisfy their needs. In the following level, Self-Protective, control of impulses occurs but with the aim of avoiding punishment to the self. During the Conformist level, individuals identify strongly with their immediate family or group; in an effort to belong to the group, the group's norms are accepted without much questioning and behavior is in line with group expectations. In the Self-Aware level, which is described as typical of college students and many adults, individuals become aware of their own feelings and more complex—and less absolute—ways of thinking and judging begin to take shape. During the Conscientious level, individuals develop internalized standards and a sense of responsibility in the world as the capacity for self-reflection and acceptance of multiple points of view becomes integrated in the self. At the Individualistic level, people come to value individuality, problematize emotional dependence, and differentiate inner from outer life. In the Autonomous level, addressing inner conflicts, tolerating ambiguity, and understanding roles begin to occur. Finally, at the Integrated level, individuals reconcile inner conflicts, cherish individuality, and attain a fully actualized identity.

Evans, Forney, and Guido-DiBrito (1998) explain that Loevinger's work is among several "theories that were popular in the early history of the student development movement . . . [and] are valuable because of the ideas they introduced but are rarely referred to in the current literature as the basis of research and practice" (xii). Perhaps one of the most valuable contributions of Loevinger's work to the concept of personal and social responsibility is that ego development appears to be a more multidimensional construct, given Loevinger's assertion that it is the master trait of personality. Thus, although Loevinger defines her theory as cognitive-

structural in nature (and it is therefore presented here as a cognitive-structural perspective), the complexity inherent in her model may allow it to be described as a forerunner to integrative perspectives of personal and social responsibility described later in this review.

A final cognitive-structural perspective of moral development, while not as elaborate in terms of stage definition as those described earlier, is that of Chickering. Among Chickering's seven vectors, or broad "conceptual lenses" of "major constellations of development during adolescence and early adulthood" (Chickering and Reisser 1993, 44), is the vector of developing integrity. Chickering and Reisser (1993) explain that moral development theory provides a basis for understanding developing integrity, in that "movement along this vector involves consciously affirming core values that are socially responsible, bringing beliefs and behavior into greater alignment, and gaining skill and consistency in the use of principled thinking" (20). Chickering conceptualizes development in this vector through "three sequential but overlapping stages" (51): humanizing values, personalizing values, and developing congruence. Humanizing values refers to a "shifting away from automatic application of uncompromising beliefs and using principled thinking in balancing one's own self-interest with the interests of one's fellow human beings" (51). Personalizing values involves "consciously affirming core values and beliefs while respecting other points of view" (51), as well as the development of individualized "guidelines . . . [that] become standards by which to flexibly assess personal actions" (52). Finally, developing congruence involves "matching personal values with socially responsible behavior" (51); a congruent moral stance recognizes the implications and consequences of a moral situation, and is one in which "the response is highly determined; it is made with conviction, without debate or equivocation" (52).

Although each of these cognitive-structural theories of moral development has a unique perspective and orientation, throughout the literature there are calls for complementary usage of multiple models in efforts to understand human development. For example, several authors assert the importance of both Kohlberg's ethic of justice *and* Gilligan's ethic of care in conceptualizing moral development and action (Chickering and Reisser 1993; Schrader 1999; Siddle Walker and Snarey 2004). Similarly, complementary use of the developmental models of Perry and Belenky et al. can provide a richer picture of college students' ethical and intellectual development (Knefelkamp 1999).

A significant critique of cognitive-structural theory raised in the literature addresses its inclusiveness of people of color; although many of the models were later tested and refined for applicability to multiple cultural groups, their initial formulation was based on a predominantly homogenous group of white, middle-class participants. One contemporary critique is provided by Siddle Walker and Snarey (2004) who, in their introduction to *Race-ing Moral Formation: African American Perspectives on Care and Justice*, call into question the relevance of both Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories for the moral development of African Americans. The authors note the lack of "raced voices" in the literature on moral development, and suggest that such voices would "question the racial inclusiveness of a primarily White-defined dichotomy of justice *versus* care" (7). Instead, Siddle Walker and Snarey claim that African Americans view "the justice of equality of opportunity and, simultaneously, the care that is associated with school success" as equally important in their children's development (7). The authors put forth five "African American justice and care basic values" (7) that are nonhierarchical, but nonetheless are "clearly developmental . . . [t]hey move, that is, toward greater maturity" (131). These values include an intertwined view of race and gender, a balance of resistance and accommodation to

overcome oppression, a unification of religious values with moral ethics, an acknowledgement of African American social activism as well as a legacy of oppression, and a blending of both community and individual interests.

This critique underscores the importance of recognizing the influence and dominance of majority perspectives in moral development theory, as well as the need to seek and incorporate non-majority voices in ongoing theory building and research. Multicultural voices representing such identity dimensions as race, class, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and others—when incorporated into the dialogue about social and personal responsibility—enable a fuller and more accurate description of moral development.

Perspectives from Domain Theory

An additional critique of cognitive-structural theory of moral development arises from domain theory, which primarily addresses the experiences and development of children. Theorists such as Turiel and Nucci claim that Kohlberg and others use a “global approach” (Nucci 2001, 6) to moral development that does not adequately distinguish between different kinds of moral issues and contexts. Nucci (2001) explains that individuals “do not hold global conceptions of social right and wrong, but *reason very differently* about matters of morality, convention, and personal choice” (6, emphasis added). Domain theory—while still examining cognitive processes such as reasoning and judging—makes distinctions between the different spheres, or “domains,” in which these cognitive processes occur.

Specifically, Turiel (2002) proposes two distinct domains of reasoning: the moral domain and the social-conventional domain. Individuals are seen as coming to different judgments about issues depending on whether they consider them to be of a moral or a social-conventional nature.

According to Nucci (2001), moral issues are “generalizable across contexts, societies, and cultures” (10) and are “are universal and nonarbitrary. The core of human morality is a concern for fairness and human welfare” (19). In contrast, issues of social convention are malleable and “their normative force holds only within the social system within which the rule was formed” (10). By using inquiry known as domain analysis—which is based on the formalist ethics principles of rule contingency, rule alterability, rule generalizability, act generalizability, and act severity—Turiel and others found that an individual’s judgment on moral matters would not change from situation to situation, but judgment on conventional matters were changeable in different contexts. Thus, domain analysis posits that individuals would affirm a moral issue in similar ways regardless of context or culture (for example, the value of preserving human life), while social-conventional issues would generate different responses (for example, the usage of proper titles in addressing authority figures). Along these lines, Turiel (2002) claims that domain analysis can provide a more detailed understanding of the relationship between moral thought and action, as individuals’ judgments of issues based on their domain lead to different responses.

This separation of the moral and social-conventional domain is believed to develop from early childhood, as Nucci (2001) states that reasoning in each separate domain undergoes parallel and “distinct patterns of age-related developmental changes” (8). It is in the question of development that domain theorists draw sharp contrasts with cognitive-structural theory. Turiel (1980) calls Kohlberg’s “dichotomy . . . between what is assumed to be the nonreasoning or conformist states of individuals at earlier developmental levels and the reasoning of individuals at advanced developmental levels” (101) a false dichotomy. Instead, domain theory posits that an individual’s choice to conform to a certain rule might be reflective of reasoning in a specific domain, rather than an indication of developmental maturity. For example, Nucci (2001)

explains, “Judgments of moral issues are justified in terms of the harm or unfairness that actions would cause, while judgments of conventions are justified in terms of norms and the expectations of authority” (10).

Rest et al. (1999) provide a detailed critique of the limitations of domain theory. First, the authors claim that it is difficult to divide moral and non-moral behavior into two hard domains, as the moral and social-conventional domains do not take into consideration agreements such as contracts, constitutions, and treaties. Secondly, the authors state that the domain view leads to endless fragmentation of contexts; in other words, there are innumerable domains given the confluence of age, situations, settings, and so forth. Rest et al. explain that when domains are viewed as “associated networks of ideas/schemas” (159), areas such as religion, work, family, and identity all can constitute multiple—rather than just two—domains in which reasoning can occur. The authors do suggest, however, that domain theory calls attention to the value of discovering relationships between specific contexts and individuals’ nuanced reasoning in those contexts.

Affective Perspectives

One critique of cognitive-structural theories of moral development is that they incompletely treat, and at times do not treat at all, the role of affect in the developmental process. Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger (1985) explain that in Kohlberg’s work, “Cognitive competence has been the core concept . . . and affective processes have only been dealt with as cognitive arguments” (192). While domain theorists claim that issues related to social convention generally elicit “cool” responses, and those related to moral issues are “rife with emotional content” (Nucci 2001, 114), affect is nonetheless viewed as subordinate to cognition.

This is evident when Nucci (2001) states that “emotional development is largely about the integration of affect into cognitive systems that are more adaptive for life” (111), and when Smetana (1999) claims that only “conceptual knowledge, not emotional responses, is transformed with age” (315).

Instead of cognition, affective theorists of moral development view emotions as the building block of moral development. Specifically, Hoffman (2000) argues for the primacy of empathic capacities in the developmental process, which are “psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own” (30). In contrast, while Kohlberg did mention that “empathy is the presupposition of moral judgment,” he did so “without any further explication of its function for moral development” (Villeneuve-Cremer and Eckensberger 1985, 177).

Hoffman describes several affective mechanisms, or modes, through which empathy is activated in the affect (Hoffman 2000; Gibbs 2003). These modes are either primitive or mature in nature. Primitive modes include mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association of emotional responses. One mature mode is that of mediated association, which occurs when an empathic response is triggered through a language-based experience (such as reading about a person in distress). Social perspective taking, also a mature mode, involves placing oneself in another’s situation; this mode is described by Hoffman as either self-focused (imagining how the self would feel in that situation) or other-focused (imagining how the other person feels).

Hoffman conceptualized five age-based stages of empathic distress which describe the development from immature to mature empathic capacities. During the first stage, Newborn Reactive Cry, infants will respond to another infant’s cry by crying themselves. In the next stage, Egocentric Empathic Distress, one-year-olds will respond to another’s distress by attempting to

self-comfort (e.g., running to one's parent when another child is hurt). In the final immature stage, Quasi-Egocentric Empathic Distress, children in their second year will attempt to help or get an adult to help someone in distress, but will construe help from an egocentric perspective (e.g., getting one's own parent to comfort another child). In the first mature stage, Viridical Empathic Distress, older children recognize that others are independent from themselves and, as such, they experience and react differently to events; a child who has developed this capacity can use contextual cues to understand the other's feelings in the unique situation at hand. The final mature stage, Broader Empathic Distress, emerges in late adolescence when individuals develop a long-term perspective of others' experiences; adolescents begin to understand that others have personal histories of suffering beyond the present situation, and can also generalize this understanding to recognize group suffering.

According to Hoffman, there are two major limitations to the development of empathy. In the first, empathic overarousal, the individual's level of empathic distress becomes so intense that personal distress ensues; as a result, the person may retreat emotionally or physically to prevent harm to self. The second limitation is empathic bias, which has two subtypes: in familiarity bias, people demonstrate an empathic preference for situations, groups, or people with which they are most familiar; and in here-and-now bias, the presenting person or needs confronting the individual are given primacy, regardless of the context or situation. It is principally in the realm of these limitations that Hoffman views the importance of cognition. Cognitive processes can help to mitigate empathic overarousal and bias, as the individual can reframe the experience to achieve a more balanced mode of empathic distress. Moral principles such as caring, or a desire to help others, and justice, or a desire for equality, can help to properly balance—by increasing or decreasing—the individual's empathic responses (Gibbs 2003). Thus,

while Hoffman views affect as the central component of moral development, cognition serves to regulate and guide affective processes as the individual matures.

Although Hoffman is the primary theorist to conceptualize affect as the central component of morality, several writers who propose integrative theories of moral development do include affect as a key component. These are detailed later in this section, in the discussion entitled Integrative Perspectives.

Social Learning Perspectives

Social learning theory provides an additional lens through which to consider the ways in which moral development occurs. Specifically, Bandura (1977, 1986) provides a general theory of social learning that also has been extended to moral development and acquisition of moral behaviors. Information-processing theories, such as that of Thomas (1997), also describe social learning aspects of moral development. Although most social learning theorists address learning in childhood and adolescence, Wenger (1998) extends this framework into adulthood with his discussion of social meaning making in communities of practice, which in turn yields particularly salient concepts for institutions of higher education.

According to Bandura (1977), all behaviors—including those that are moral—are learned through observation of others. This learning occurs primarily during childhood and adolescence, though the environment provides reinforcement for learned behaviors into adulthood. Bandura describes the general principles of social learning: modeled behavior has better chance of being adopted if it results in an outcome that is both valued by the observer and has direct functional use; and behavior is more likely to be adopted if the model for the behavior is perceived as similar to the observer and as having admired status.

Learning does not just occur automatically through observation, however. Bandura posits several underlying cognitive processes in the observer that facilitate higher levels of social learning. First, the observer's capacities for attention to modeled events, as well as the observer's unique characteristics, affect depth of learning. Retention of modeled behavior is also important, as learning involves the observer's coding, organizing, and rehearsing of observed behaviors. Motor reproduction of behaviors involves the observer's capacity for self-observation and incorporating accurate feedback in learning. The observer's motivation for learning—whether external, vicarious, or self-driven—also has an impact on the success of acquiring behaviors. An additional cognitive process is described by Rotter (Rotter, Chance, and Phares 1972), who views expectations about future outcomes as a primary determinant of an individual's behavior.

Applying this general theory of social learning to moral behavior, Bandura (1977) and others (Sieber 1980) view adults in teaching, modeling, and reinforcing roles. Bandura's research shows that when given the opportunity to observe adult models making moral judgments, children tend to have more mature responses to moral situations. Bandura explains development of moral reasoning in similar terms: as children's cognitive abilities mature, parents and others use more complex ways of eliciting moral behavior. For example, parents of toddlers use simplistic demands and punishment for noncompliance with behavior standards, while parents of teenagers will often explain legal codes and discuss societal rules to elicit desired behavior. Similarly, Sieber (1980) explains that while classical and operant conditioning are the primary means of eliciting prosocial behavior during early childhood, older children learn to behave morally through observation of models as well as adults' shaping of behavior (rewarding behaviors that approximate those desired) and substituting behaviors (teaching children how to exchange prosocial for antisocial behaviors). Thus an individual's moral reasoning develops as

models in the environment demonstrate more complex ways of dealing with moral issues.

Social learning theory also underscores the importance of the environment in reinforcing moral behavior. Bandura (1977)—through his research with children—emphasizes the role of vicarious reinforcement in the development of moral and immoral behaviors. In one landmark study, Bandura demonstrated that when a model was reinforced for an aggressive response, observers showed an increase in the same response. In this experiment, children who watched a film of a model hitting an inflated clown doll and then witnessed the model being praised (positively reinforced) for the aggression also became more aggressive themselves, without any personalized or further reinforcement. This finding laid the groundwork for recent, widely publicized studies demonstrating the vicarious effects of television violence and their positive correlation with aggressive behavior in children (National Institute of Mental Health 1982; Huesmann et al. 2003).

In later writings, Bandura (1986) further expanded his view of the environment's role in learning with the concept of reciprocal determinism. Bandura came to view the environment and child as having equal influence on each other in the learning process. This reciprocity is demonstrated in a cycle of learning and behavior: children's mental representations of the world influence their behavior; their behavior determines how those in the environment will react to them; and others' reactions influence children's thinking and behavior in future situations. Thus, over time children develop a set of approaches and behaviors in moral situations that have been forged through—and reinforced by—interaction with the environment. As Sieber (1980) explains, "When applied to the acquisition of morality, social learning theory is useful in explaining how particular response tendencies are acquired and how they are orchestrated into a somewhat consistent approach to moral dilemmas" (130).

Although not specifically classified as social learning theory, information-processing perspectives of moral development also address how moral learning and behavior result from an individual's interaction with the environment. One such model is proposed by Thomas (1997), who offers the following definition: "the term *moral development* refers to *changes in the system by which people make moral decisions*" (18). In Thomas's view, decision making involves the interaction of the environment, long-term memory, and working memory. The environment—which includes elements such as moral fabricators (parents and teachers) and contexts (schools)—enables children to witness moral events in action, to learn how they should act in moral situations, and to observe consequences of moral behaviors. Long-term memory is responsible for "storing coded material from the person's past experiences" (21), which includes moral needs and goals, facts and concepts, values and mental processes, and the individual's notions of self-identity. Working memory is defined as an "arena of active thought, the stage on which the processes of interacting with the world and of manipulating contents of long-term memory are being performed at any given moment" (31), though many of its functions are performed subconsciously.

According to Thomas, when individuals encounter a moral situation in the environment, they experience a series of steps that activates their long term memory. First, a moral event is perceived if it meets the definition stored in long-term memory. Next, the individual retrieves action options from memory, and then estimates consequences of those actions. After weighing the consequences, the individual chooses an action that is perceived as having a balanced set of advantages and disadvantages. The individual then acts, experiences the consequences of the action, and receives feedback on the consequences from the environment. This feedback is then encoded and stored in long-term memory, to be called upon when a similar moral situation

occurs again in the future. Thus, moral development occurs through biological maturation and through “working memory’s environmental encounters” (34) that are then stored in long-term memory for future use. These steps are reminiscent of Bandura’s reciprocal determinism, in which children’s mental representations lead to specific behaviors and the experienced consequences of behaviors are then integrated into their mental representations.

Thomas asserts that while children are born without an innate sense of right and wrong, they do have the capacity to develop a conscience through social learning. Through their encounters with the environment over the years, the contents of the conscience are constructed and refined. Along with this conscience, people add more advanced and complex ways of thinking and behaving in moral situations to their existing moral repertoire. Thus, individuals can draw upon any one of these learned cognitive and behavioral approaches, depending on which approach is activated in memory by the presenting situation.

While the social learning theorists discussed thus far primarily examine development during childhood and early adolescence, Wenger (1998) provides a social learning view of adult “communities of practice.” According to Wenger, communities of practice are characterized by mutual engagement, joint enterprise, and a shared repertoire of meaning and discourse. As these characteristics can be descriptive of colleges and universities, Wenger’s view is particularly helpful when considering social learning in higher education.

Wenger asserts that learning is “a fundamentally social phenomenon reflecting our own deeply social nature as human beings” (3). Social learning differs for adults in that it focuses on making meaning of experience, rather than acquiring behavior. Communities of practice, such as schools, are contexts in which this learning—or meaning making—occurs: “We all have our own theories and ways of understanding the world, and our communities of practice are places where

we develop, negotiate, and share them” (48). While the focus of social learning in adults is not behavior acquisition, Wenger nonetheless identifies a link between participation in communities of practice and behavior: “Such participation shapes not only what we do, but also who we are and how we interpret what we do” (4).

“Practice” is described as the enterprise through which these communities develop shared meanings. According to Wenger, practice is not simply completing a set of tasks, nor is it an abstract consideration of larger-than-life philosophical questions. Rather, “*practice is about meaning as an experience of everyday life*” (52). Like Bandura’s concept of reciprocal determinism, Wenger’s description of the development of this meaning stresses a “negotiation” process, or an interaction between the environment and the individual in constructing meaning: “By living in the world we do not just make meanings up independently of the world, but neither does the world simply impose meanings on us” (53-54).

While Wenger does not directly address moral development, key concepts from his theory are useful in thinking about higher education as a community of practice in which such development may occur. First, the reciprocal relationship between the community of practice and the individual can be extended to the construction of moral meaning, which can in turn affect moral behavior; thus, institutions of higher education and their community members—students, faculty, staff, alumni, and many others—all share in the community’s moral dialogue and help shape its moral environment. Secondly, Wenger explains, “Negotiated meaning is at once both historical and dynamic, contextual and unique” (54); as part of a particular community of practice, members of a specific college or university can be seen as engaging in a highly nuanced conversation about morality. Therefore, while common language and meaning across the field of higher education may be negotiable, specific moral contexts at each college and university will

yield a unique moral exchanges.

Integrative Perspectives

Up to this point, cognitive-structural, domain, affective, and social learning perspectives of moral development have been presented. Each has a unique focus for its description of moral development: cognitive-structural and domain theories focus on the development of cognitive processes; affective theory focuses primarily on the development of empathy; and social learning theory focuses primarily on the development of moral behavior.

There is burgeoning discussion in the literature, however, that this divided approach is inadequate to describing the complexities of moral development. Rest (1984) suggests that the theoretical tendency to “divide the field into behavior, affect, and cognition . . . is deficient for many reasons” (25), chief among them that it “leave[s] us dangling about how behavior, affect, and cognition are related” (25). Burton (1984) states that such relationships are indeed “treated with benign neglect” (193) by most theorists. This problem exists most poignantly in the lack of understanding of relationships between the moral components and moral behavior, regardless of perspective. For example, research on cognitive development and moral behavior posits that while both appear to be related, the relationship is inconsistent and unclear (Rest 1984); Morrill (1980) observes that the “question concerning the relationship of knowledge to action, or of moral theory to practice, seems to fall decidedly short of receiving an adequate answer . . . we find only partial answers, avoidance of the issue, or acceptance of the separation” (54). Similarly, when considering the relationship between affective development and moral behavior, Hoffman (1984) himself notes, “Perhaps the most fundamental limitation of empathy-based morality is that there are aspects of moral action to which it may have little relevance” (297).

And according to Rest (1984), although social learning theory describes how moral behaviors are acquired, it does not adequately address “the inner processes that gave rise to the behavior” (26). This in turn precludes knowledge of how the behavior “is likely to generalize to other situations” (26) as well as attempts at “understanding, predicting, and influencing moral behavior” (26).

The question then becomes whether these three perspectives may be combined to yield an integrated understanding of moral development, or if a model of development that incorporates yet transcends the domains of cognition, affect, and behavior is needed. Lickona (1991) proposes a tripartite model of moral development that takes the former approach, while Rest (1984) and Berkowitz (1997) each propose a more elaborate conceptualization of moral development over the lifespan.

Lickona (1991), in a discussion of character education for young children in schools, states, “Character so conceived has three interrelated parts: moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral behavior . . . habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and habits of action” (51). Lickona claims that “all three are necessary for leading a moral life; all three make up moral maturity” (51). Moral knowing is described as involving moral awareness, values, perspective taking, moral reasoning, and decision making. Moral feeling includes the conscience, self-esteem, empathy, and humility. Finally, moral action is founded on moral competence (the ability to turn moral judgment and feeling into action), moral will (the unction to do what’s right), and moral habit (an unconscious proclivity to do what’s right). Lickona views moral action as an “outcome” (61) of both moral knowing and moral feeling, and the moral environment in which individuals are situated as a key factor in whether people behave morally.

Like Lickona, Rest et al. (1999) acknowledge that there are “truly different facets to morality and that morality is a multiplicity of processes” (100). In their attempt to develop a

“synthesis” (100) of these processes, as well as of the different theoretical perspectives of moral development, the authors propose a four-component model involving moral sensitivity, judgment, motivation and character. Rest (1984) explains that the concept of moral sensitivity—which draws upon theories of affect and social cognition, among others—entails both interpreting a situation for its moral content, and understanding how one’s actions in the situation will affect others (for a detailed discussion of and evidence for moral sensitivity as a distinct construct, see Bebeau and Brabeck 1989). Based in a cognitive-structural perspective, the dimension of moral judgment involves reasoning about what “ought” to be done in a moral situation (30). Moral motivation, or the “degree of commitment to taking the moral course of action, valuing moral values over other values, and taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes” (Rest et al. 1999, 101), has its grounding in multiple perspectives such as theories of affect, identity, and social learning. Finally, Rest et al. describe moral character as “persisting in a moral task, having courage, overcoming fatigue and temptations, and implementing subroutines that serve a moral goal” (101); this domain of morality is seen by Rest (1984) as being described by theories that address psychological functions such as “ego strength” (33) and locus of control. As each person has both strengths and weaknesses in these four areas, Rest (1984) explains that “the production of moral behavior involves all four component processes and that deficiencies in any component can result in failure to behave morally” (35-36). Descriptions of the four-component model do not explain the specific relationships between the components, however, and Rest (1984) states that this comprises a key area for future research.

Like Rest, Berkowitz (2002) proposes a multifaceted view of moral development in what he terms the “moral anatomy,” or the “psychological components that make up the complete moral person” (48). And similar to Rest, Berkowitz (1997) draws upon various theories of moral

development in identifying seven components of moral anatomy: moral behavior, moral character, moral values, moral reason, moral emotion, moral identity, and meta-moral characteristics. Berkowitz explains that the first component, moral behavior, involves engaging in moral acts, but in a reflective fashion that is not merely in compliance with an absolute authority. The second component, moral character, refers to an individual's moral "personality; i.e. the unique and enduring tendency of an individual to act in certain ways and not in other ways" (15); Berkowitz views character and behavior in a dynamic relationship, in which behaviors mold habits, habits then shape character, and character reshapes behavior.

In his third component of moral anatomy, Berkowitz concedes that moral values are defined in many different ways in the literature—alternatively as beliefs, preferences, and standards—but gives his definition of moral values as "affectively laden beliefs concerning the rightness and wrongness of behaviors or end states" (18). Furthermore, Berkowitz cites domain theories of moral development in describing moral values as "values that concern issues of intrinsic harm and universal prescriptivity" (16), but he also issues a caveat: individuals may differ on whether they view a given value as moral or amoral. For example, adults may view issues of self-harm—such as teenage drug use—as a moral issue, while adolescents themselves may view such issues as falling within the personal—rather than moral—domain. This is an important distinction, as it may help to explain why individuals behave differently based on whether they construe an issue as involving either moral or personal values.

Berkowitz cites Kohlberg's cognitive-structural theory of moral development as the most adequate framework for understanding the fourth component, moral reason, which is defined as the capacity to deal with morally ambiguous situations through reflective decision making. Moral emotions, which comprise the fifth component of the moral anatomy, are classified as

either self-critical (negative emotions such as guilt and regret) or prosocial (positive emotions such as empathy and compassion) in nature. As the sixth component, moral identity, requires mature self-reflective abilities, it often develops during adolescence or later. For individuals who have a mature moral identity, “being moral is critical to their sense of self” (21), and they strive to behave in ways that are consistent with their self-concept (for a detailed discussion of moral identity, see Blasi 1984, 1985). The final component of Berkowitz’s moral anatomy, meta-moral characteristics, are those elements of personality that “are not intrinsically moral but may *serve* moral ends” (23); Berkowitz gives the example of self-discipline, which may be equally necessary for engaging in moral action (e.g., academic honesty) as it is in immoral behavior (e.g., criminal activity).

In addition to describing these components of the moral anatomy, Berkowitz highlights key points of growth in character from infancy to adolescence. During the infant and toddler years, children develop the capacity for empathy, a concept of distinct persons, and attachment bonds with caregivers. During later childhood, abilities such as self-control and perspective taking are added to children’s repertoires. Adolescence is a time when moral reasoning flourishes in conjunction with developing cognitive skills; during this period, teenagers’ notions of right and wrong become socially (as opposed to egocentrically) oriented, morality is aligned with specific behaviors (such as cheating), and the formation of a moral identity begins to take place. Unlike many other character theorists, however, Berkowitz extends this last period of moral development from adolescence into the college years, which may make his model particularly salient for conceptualizing personal and social responsibility in higher education. Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) explain that colleges and universities can provide environments that not only teach, display, and demand character, but also give opportunities for students to

practice and reflect upon character. As such, students' moral identities can continue to evolve and mature if nurturing contexts are provided by higher education.

Toward a Shared Definition: Future Directions

The literature addressing personal and social responsibility can be generally categorized into four theoretical perspectives: cognitive-structural, domain, affective, and social learning. Although a few integrative perspectives are offered in the literature, as discussed earlier, Berkowitz (1997) describes the overall state of theory, research, and practice in the field as fragmented:

Each group sees morality as flourishing in a narrow realm, embraces models that directly address that realm, implements programs designed to affect that realm, and uses different criteria for choosing labels for their respective enterprises. The Tower of Babel is an apt metaphor (13).

Given the pressing need for a shared definition to further work in the field, it is tempting to select one theoretical perspective—one language from the many competing languages—and simply move forward from that framework. There are dangers inherent in such a decision, however. Berkowitz (1997) borrows language from Perry when he argues against a “dualistic perspective” (13) in which one theory is viewed as ultimately correct and all others as incorrect. Berkowitz explains that when scholars, researchers, and practitioners embrace such duality, they run the risk of reductionism: “As a result we keep trying to explain and control human behavior with very narrow simplistic models, rather than embracing the complexity and richness of human functioning and searching for equivalently complex and rich solutions” (12).

If any single perspective of personal and social responsibility is inadequate, the question then becomes how multiple frameworks might be used to better address the complexity inherent in human morality. The integrative perspectives discussed earlier—those of Lickona (1991),

Rest (1984), and Berkowitz (1997)—provide promising starting points for considering the multifaceted “moral person” (Berkowitz 1997, 14). The work of Rest and Berkowitz are particularly useful, in that they both explicitly incorporate elements of cognitive-structural, domain, affective, and social learning perspectives. These integrative frameworks, or a new synthesis of multiple elements of personal and social responsibility, might provide the foundation for defining and delineating the moral self.

Merely cataloguing the components of the moral person, however, would almost certainly not yield an adequate definition of personal and social responsibility. Both Rest and Berkowitz concede that while very little is actually known about the relationships between the various dimensions of morality—behavior, cognition, affect, motivation, character, values, and so forth—an understanding of these relationships is critical for future thought and research. Any definition of personal and social responsibility will likely have inherent assumptions about these relationships (for example, that more complex ways of thinking, feeling, and valuing might lead to more complex ways of behaving morally). It therefore becomes important to make these assumptions explicit while at the same time working toward understanding these relationships through research. Of particular interest may be the relationship of behavior to other moral dimensions, as behavior is often the realm in which moral concerns and crises are immediately observable (e.g., a rise in drug use or a spate of violent crime on a college campus). Given the complexity and contextuality of human behavior, the question of what leads individuals to behave a certain way in moral situations is most likely answered by a confluence of moral dimensions identified in the literature—again, supporting the usage of multiple frameworks in conceptualizing personal and social responsibility.

Also crucial for any shared definition of personal and social responsibility is full

consideration not only of the individual, but also of the moral environments in which the individual is situated. Many perspectives in the literature—likely due to their historical grounding in early theories of psychology—discuss the moral environment primarily in terms of its capacity to shape the individual (for example, cognitive-structural theorists might consider an environment predominantly for its ability to promote developmental growth in the individual). This results in an unclear picture not only of how the moral environment actually does shape the personal and social responsibility of individuals, but also of how individuals themselves shape the moral environments which they comprise. An understanding of this dynamic relationship would likely lead to more effective educational design on multiple levels. Wenger's (1998) perspective of communities of practice may be a generative starting point for conceptualizing a more dynamic relationship between individuals and moral environments, especially in light of its applicability for adult educational contexts like colleges and universities.

Several additional guiding principles for movement toward a shared definition of personal and social responsibility can be suggested. First, given the fragmented state of applicable theory, any shared definition should clearly articulate the various theoretical perspectives it incorporates, as well as take into account the implications of these perspectives for terminology (for example, employing the term “moral development” may imply a cognitive-structural perspective, or “moral domain” a domain theory perspective). Second, any definition of personal and social responsibility is likely to be tentative and subject to refinement in light of future theory and research. Although this is an assumption of most scholars and researchers, it nonetheless should be made explicit given the tendency for dualism and “competing theories, methods, and rationales” in the field (Berkowitz 1997, 11).

Finally, future dialogue on personal and social responsibility should ensure the

incorporation of diverse voices. From a historical perspective, the majority of theories addressing personal and social responsibility originated from research with homogenous groups of participants, although they were later tested and expanded to include other populations. Models have since been developed addressing the experiences of women (Gilligan 1982, Belenky et al. 1997) and African Americans (Siddle Walker and Snarey 2004), and there have been numerous calls for their complementary use with preceding models to generate fuller descriptions of human experience. Any future thought and research on personal and social responsibility has the obligation to incorporate multiple voices and realities spanning dimensions of race, gender, class, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, religion, disability, and beyond. Maxine Greene's (1993) description of democratic community is thus salient for any emerging definition of personal and social responsibility:

[I]t must be one responsive to increasing numbers of life-stories, to more and more "different" voices. Yes, many of the shapes are alike: there are tonalities that resemble one another, that merge. But there are differing nuances, shimmering contours; no one exactly duplicates any other. This is what ought to be attended to, even as we resonate to what is common, what is shared (218).

Given the diversity of contemporary higher education, the adequacy of such a shared definition may be proportionate to its inclusiveness of these different voices.

II. Educating for Responsibility

Several of the theoretical perspectives presented in this review assert that the moral formation—whatever it may entail—is complete or nearly so by the end of childhood or early adolescence. The question then becomes whether growth and learning in the area of personal and social responsibility actually occur in higher education contexts. A brief review of the literature will establish that such growth and learning does indeed occur in higher education, and therefore a second question can be posed: how might colleges and universities enhance personal and social responsibility through curricular and pedagogical efforts? This latter discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive catalogue of all moral education programs and initiatives in higher and other educational settings; rather, it highlights significant approaches—based in the five theoretical perspectives described earlier—that show promise for promoting personal and social responsibility at the college level. Finally, recommendations regarding future directions in educating for personal and social responsibility will be presented.

What Happens in College?

In response to the question of whether growth and learning in the area of personal and social responsibility actually occurs in college, Colby et al. (2003) state, “In spite of the dramatic developmental changes that take place in the first eighteen years of life, many developmental issues remain only partially resolved for undergraduates” (99). The authors claim that moral development is a salient issue not only for traditionally-aged college students but also for adult and returning students, as “dimensions of moral and civic character continue to develop

throughout life” (99). The “dimensions” for which there is the most empirical evidence for development in college are moral reasoning, moral behavior, and moral values. The evidence for development in each of these dimensions is summarized below.

Moral Reasoning

As mentioned earlier, the cognitive-structural perspective is the predominant theoretical framework used in research on personal and social responsibility during the college years. Thus, the majority of empirical evidence for growth and learning in this area arises from research based on the work of cognitive-structuralists such as Kohlberg, Perry, and King, and Kitchener. In general, research in this area confirms that students do experience significant change from simplistic to more complex ways of reasoning about moral issues.

In their meta-analysis of research on the effects of college attendance, Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) state that “we infer from the body of evidence that *a* major (if not *the* major) change that takes place during college is a movement from conventional moral reasoning toward postconventional moral reasoning” (343). In making this claim, the authors cite research conducted with Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT), both of which are measurements based on Kohlberg’s developmental scheme. Gains in moral reasoning, according to Pascarella and Terenzini, are consistent across different cultural groups, and are enhanced through “interactions with peers who are themselves functioning at more sophisticated levels of moral reasoning and intellectual complexity” (621) as well as “instructional interventions stressing dilemma discussion and personality development” (618) and “contact with divergent perspectives” (623). In addition, there is tentative evidence, based on a small number of studies, that the first two years of college may yield the largest gains in

moral reasoning. Interestingly, Rest (1979a) reports that findings on Kohlberg's model seem to indicate a "cessation of moral judgment development once [adults] leave school. Our data suggest that development continues for as long as adults are in school, and then upon leaving, reaches a plateau" (19). Despite these findings regarding the positive effect of college attendance on moral reasoning, Pascarella and Terenzini explain that the "absence of descriptive statistics in much of the evidence, however, makes it difficult if not impossible to estimate with confidence the magnitude" of the effect (562). Additionally, while King and Mayhew (2004) report that liberal arts colleges are "the only institutional type with consistently large effect size," existing research studies "do not explain why liberal arts environments are effective in promoting moral reasoning" (396). Both of these areas may be germane for future research.

Research on the Perry scheme also shows that students generally develop more complex ways of thinking and valuing during college. Mentkowski, Moeser, and Strait (1983), in a study of 737 undergraduate students of varying ages at Alverno College, utilized Knefelkamp and Widick's Measure of Intellectual Development (MID) to assess change in student positionality on the Perry scheme. Mentkowski, Moeser, and Strait summarize their findings as follows: "There was a tendency for Freshman essays to show a significant element of Dualistic thinking even though the dominant position was one of Multiplicity; while for graduating students, essays tended to be rated at a 'stable' Multiplistic perspective, or show signs of movement toward Relativism" (161). While the authors report this transition to greater intellectual and ethical complexity during college, they caution that their findings also show that "students can be at different levels of cognitive and ethical development in different areas of life, that is, that level of development is somewhat situation-specific or issue-specific" (167). This suggests that

students' intellectual and ethical development can be influenced not only by college attendance in general, but also by specific aspects of college and other life experiences.

King and Kitchener (1994) also report development in reflective judgment during the college years. From results on the Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI), the authors found that while first-year college students averaged about 3.5, the seniors' average score was 4.0; thus, freshmen "evidenced assumptions most consistent with Stages 3 and 4 of the Reflective Judgment Model" (224) while seniors tended to exhibit characteristics of Stage 4 (or even Stage 5) thinking more frequently. Regarding the half-stage difference between freshmen and senior averages, the authors explain, "Although this numerical difference is small, the development in reasoning it reflects is noteworthy: the Stage 4 reasoning prevalent among the senior samples is clearly more adequate than the reasoning it replaced" (225). Specifically, "a sizable proportion of the freshmen tested expressed the beliefs that absolute truth is only temporarily inaccessible, that knowing is limited to one's personal impressions about the topic (uninformed by evidence), and that most if not all problems are well structured" (224); in contrast, seniors' scores reflect the "acknowledgement that uncertainty is not just a temporary condition of knowing . . . [and] a move away from the absolutism of pre-reflective thinking and toward reflective thinking" (225). Thus, while freshmen would "have considerable difficulty in knowing what to believe or how to decide in the face of this uncertainty" (224), seniors might employ more complex ways of dealing with ill-structured problems. According to King and Kitchener, this shift in reflective thinking may have implications for students' abilities to address moral issues and dilemmas, as they describe "structural similarity in the development of people's conceptions of moral rights and responsibility and conceptions of knowledge and justification" (206).

Thus, from research on Kohlberg's model of moral development, the Perry scheme, and the Reflective Judgment Model, there is ample evidence that cognitive aspects of personal and social responsibility—namely moral reasoning—continue to develop during the college years. This evidence would suggest that educating for personal and social responsibility is indeed a legitimate consideration for higher education.

Moral Behavior

Moral behavior constitutes another dimension of personal and social responsibility that has received ample attention in the literature. It bears mentioning at the onset, however, that there is some disagreement in the literature about what makes a given behavior moral. Domain theorists, as discussed earlier, posit that some behaviors fall within the moral domain while others are matters of social convention. In addition, there is some discussion of whether substance use—an issue of self-harm—is a moral issue or an area of personal prerogative, especially since many adolescents who use substances believe the latter. Nevertheless, extensive research on specific behaviors—such as academic dishonesty, drug and alcohol use, and criminal behavior on the college campus—is published with frequency, to the degree that fully documenting these studies is impractical for the purposes of this review. A short discussion of seminal work on moral or morally related behavior (however it may be defined) in college provides ample evidence that such behavior is indeed an issue in higher education.

Astin (1993) presents research findings related to the effects of college attendance on “Hedonism,” defined by three behavioral measures of drinking beer, smoking cigarettes, and staying up all night (119). Astin states that research on these behaviors “suggests that the ‘college effect’ on Hedonism is positive and accounted for primarily by the effects of leaving

home” (120). With regard to drinking behaviors, Astin reports that there is a “positive association of alcohol consumption” with variables such as membership in a fraternity or sorority, amount of time spent socializing or watching television per week, and participation in certain types of sports activities (172).

Although a popular topic for research (as well as campus intervention programs), alcohol use in college is by no means the only moral behavior addressed in the literature. In their survey of institutions of higher education, Levine and Cureton (1998) provide a menu of students’ behavioral problems, including a rise over the past two decades in eating disorders (by 58 percent), classroom disruption (by 44 percent), drug abuse (by 42 percent), gambling (by 25 percent), and suicide attempts (by 23 percent). In addition, 51 percent of sexually active students are reported as failing to practice safe sex, an issue in which students evidenced an “ambiguity about the dividing line between health risks and issues of morality” (113). Students are described as “loners” (100) who “are coming to college overwhelmed and more damaged than those of previous years” (95), with resulting use of counseling and psychological services rising dramatically on the college campus. Levine and Cureton describe the overall impact of these behavioral issues on both the individual student and the campus community:

The effect of the accumulated fears and hurts that students have experienced is to divide and isolate them. Undergraduates have developed a lifeboat mentality of sorts. It is as if each student is alone in a boat in a terrible storm, far from any harbor. The boat is taking on water and believed to be in imminent danger of sinking. Under these circumstances, there is but one alternative: each student must single-mindedly bail. Conditions are so bad that no one has time to care for others who may also be foundering. No distractions are permitted. The pressure is enormous and unremitting (96).

This description may well leave the reader with the impression of campus climates nearing moral bankruptcy, regardless of the dimension of personal and social responsibility under consideration.

Schrader (1999), in a study of sixty-five college students aged eighteen to twenty-two, reports that college students are ill-equipped to engage in moral behavior when faced with moral dilemmas. In a “brief look at a living process of how some college students experience their moral realities” (37), Schrader identified nine categories of moral dilemmas faced by college students, in order of descending frequency: close personal relationships (e.g., confronting a friend about drug use or deciding whether to keep an abusive friend); cheating and stealing; authority issues (e.g., breaking family rules); infidelity issues; greed; life issues (e.g., euthanization); peer pressure; and respect, or students’ “taking revenge on someone who ‘disrespected’ them” (47). According to Schrader’s findings, “The most oft-used strategies for resolving these dilemmas involved considering consequences to the self, one’s own feelings, and rationalizing decisions that required immediate (as opposed to reflected upon) resolutions” (47). Not surprisingly, these approaches proved largely ineffective in generating decisive moral action: “[M]ost cases resolved the dilemmas by letting the issue drop, by doing nothing, by going along with the situation or with others in it, and by letting the problem resolve itself somehow” (48). Schrader’s findings may be particularly helpful in understanding the aforementioned problems with moral behavior in college:

These strategies for resolving the moral problem again demonstrate the complexity of students’ thought processes and their struggles in working with moral issues . . . students seem to have all the materials they need for creating their moral pictures, but might not have the fully developed ability . . . to create a good moral outcome (48).

If this is indeed the case, then helping students learn ways to create these positive moral outcomes can constitute a legitimate educational goal for colleges and universities.

Moral Values

The dimension of moral values has not received nearly equal attention in the literature when compared with moral cognition and behavior. This is possibly due to a lack of shared meaning regarding the term “values” and what actually constitutes a moral value. Nevertheless, research indicates that change does occur in certain values (however they may be defined) cited as being of import to the development of personal and social responsibility.

Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) conclude that “the evidence is abundant and consistent in indicating that changes toward greater altruism, humanitarianism, and sense of civic responsibility and social conscience occur during the college years” (277). Similarly, Astin (1993) describes increases in the value of “social activism” during college, which he defines as “the importance the student assigns to . . . participating in community-action programs, helping others who are in difficulty, influencing social values, and influencing the political structure” (115). Astin claims the change in this value is “attributable, at least in part, to the impact of the college experience” (115), and is positively influenced by factors such as degree of positive interaction with peers and faculty.

Interestingly, Astin’s research also examined variables associated with students’ endorsement of the statement, “Realistically, an individual person can do little to bring about changes in our society” (154). Disagreement with this statement was found to be positively affected by such variables as attendance of a college away from home, institutional emphasis on social activism and community, interaction with faculty outside of class, socialization with

people of different races or ethnicities, participation in religious services, and time spent volunteering. Students' efforts to bring about such societal change are often grassroots in nature, as Levine and Cureton (1998) describe a "new localism" (36) in which college students typically choose to volunteer at the local level rather than try to effect national or global change.

Finally, Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) state that several national studies addressing issues such as civil rights, racism, and anti-Semitism "uniformly report shifts toward social, racial, ethnic, and political tolerance and greater support for the rights of individuals in a wide variety of areas" (279) during the college years. When this shift is considered along with increases in humanitarianism, civic responsibility, social conscience, social activism, and volunteerism described in the literature, it is clear that the college campus is a place where value change can and does occur.

Other Dimensions, Future Directions

The developmental trajectories of other elements of what Berkowitz (2002) termed the "moral anatomy" (69)—such as moral character, emotion, and identity—are not as well examined or documented in the literature. Certainly, this constitutes a major gap in current understandings of personal and social responsibility as well as a promising area for future research. In addition, as described in Part I, an understanding of how these moral dimensions relate to one another is lacking in the literature. In most dimensions, there is also inconclusive evidence about the actual magnitude of change in college. However, there is enough evidence in the literature that growth and learning in personal and social responsibility does indeed occur during the college years to provide support for higher education's role in educating for personal and social responsibility.

Is It Our Business?

Even though research shows that dimensions of personal and social responsibility do continue to develop in college, an important question to consider is whether institutions of higher education *should* educate for such development. In reality, many educators at all levels are reluctant to address moral issues with students, either out of fear of imposing their own values on students, a belief that morality is an inherently personal issue, or a conviction that teaching and learning should be restricted to subject matter content. Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) assert, “Those in higher education often balk at what they may view as tampering with students’ morality” (17). Given this not uncommon view that educating for personal and social responsibility may be “none of our business,” it is important to consider and enumerate possible justifications for moral education, whatever forms it may take.

Addressing students’ behavioral problems, as noted earlier, is a common rationale for moral education programs. Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) argue that such problems provide one major justification for implementing character education at the college level: “[A]s most college educators are well aware, there are significant moral problems prevalent on college and university campuses—alcohol abuse, date rape, academic dishonesty, vandalism, and assault, to name a few” (18). Colleges and universities typically have focused prevention programs to address these issues, such as substance abuse prevention programs, alcohol-free events, and crime prevention and campus safety interventions. These programs, while often based in research, do not generally address the larger moral questions implicit in and provoked by these behaviors; thus, while these targeted, behavior-specific prevention programs are necessary and oftentimes effectual, in and of themselves they do not constitute a comprehensive educational

approach for personal and social responsibility at the college level. As discussed earlier, the relationship between moral behavior and other elements of the moral person—such as judgment, affect, values, and identity—has not been well established in the literature. For now, then, because a preponderance of existing behaviorally oriented programs do not address morality and it is unclear if or how moral education affects (let alone produces) moral behavior, caution is warranted in citing reduction of behavioral problems as justification for moral education.

Perhaps a more compelling argument in the literature is that schools—based on their nature as educational institutions—inherently educate for morality, regardless of whether they do so intentionally or not. Damon (1988) describes this phenomenon at the elementary level, but his observations can be extrapolated to institutions of higher education as well:

In their efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to learning, teachers constantly draw their pupils' attention to the standards of orderliness, respect for others, the work ethic, honesty, and responsibility. . . . In the process, basic moral values are communicated to the young. These values, implicit in every procedure and demand of the school setting, are taken from the culture that has produced the school and remain generally consistent with those of the culture. The school provides an important training ground for learning and mastering these values (130).

When this view is applied to colleges and universities, multiple elements of the institution's culture can provide moral instruction for students; for example, honor codes can encourage students to personally adopt the institution's value of academic integrity, while integration of multiculturalism in the curriculum can help students learn to value diversity. And at a fundamental level, Colby et al. (2003) state in order for colleges to fulfill their central "educational and scholarly missions," they must necessarily "foster values such as mutual respect, open-mindedness, the willingness to listen to and take seriously the ideas of others, procedural fairness, and public discussion of contested issues" (13). The authors explain that

while such value lessons are often part of the “hidden curriculum” (11), they nonetheless provide moral instruction for students.

If colleges and universities—by their very nature as educational institutions—provide moral education to students, then reflecting on and actively crafting this education would be logical. Along these lines, Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) posit, “Education inevitably affects character, either intentionally or unintentionally. To abstain is merely to abdicate control to chance or other influences” (18). Similarly, Colby et al. (2003) assert their conviction that “moral and civic messages are unavoidable in higher education and that it is better to pay explicit attention to the content of these messages and how they are conveyed than to leave students’ moral and civic socialization to chance” (xi).

Moving beyond the argument that institutions of higher education provide moral education by default, many view colleges and universities as having an obligation to prepare morally astute individuals who will positively contribute to the communities in which they will participate. The AAC&U (2002) report *Greater Expectations: A New Vision for Learning as a Nation Goes to College* provides a descriptive picture of how educating “responsible” learners can have an impact beyond the college campus:

Empowered and informed learners are also responsible. Through discussion, critical analysis, and introspection, they come to understand their roles in society and accept active participation. Open-minded and empathetic, responsible learners understand how abstract values relate to decisions in their lives. Responsible learners appreciate others, while also assuming accountability for themselves, their complex identities, and their conduct . . . they help society shape its ethical values, and then live by those values (23).

Developing these capacities likely requires an intentional approach above and beyond the traditional academic endeavors of colleges and universities. Along these lines, Colby et al.

(2003) state that educating for academic skills alone is not sufficient to preparing graduates with moral and civic commitment:

If today's college graduates are to be positive forces in this world, they need not only to possess knowledge and intellectual capacities but also to see themselves as members of a community, as individuals with a responsibility to contribute to their communities. They must be willing to act for the common good and capable of doing so effectively (6).

Although many institutions espouse the goal of producing morally responsible as well as intellectually competent graduates in their mission statements, colleges and universities—in practice—do not generally educate for morality as intentionally or proficiently as they do for intellectual skills. With this fact—as well as the justifications for engaging in moral education—in mind, promising educational approaches for enhancing personal and social responsibility will now be considered.

Educating from the Five Perspectives

The question of how colleges and universities might enhance personal and social responsibility can be considered from the five perspectives—cognitive-structural, domain, affective, social learning, and integrative—described earlier. Because of the popularity and prevalence of moral education programs, the following discussion of educational approaches begins with a caveat: an exhaustive listing of all formulations of moral education will not be provided here. Instead, major approaches that show promise for promoting personal and social responsibility are presented, with partiality given to those that are: 1) specific to higher education; 2) well documented and cross-referenced in the literature; and 3) substantiated by research. In addition, approaches that are comprehensive in their view are favored over those that have a singular focus (e.g., discussion of ways to integrate moral education into the entire

curriculum versus the design of a single ethics course), with the rationale that broader perspectives may provide a greater number and depth of answers to the question of how colleges and universities can educate for personal and social responsibility.

Cognitive-Structural Perspectives

In keeping with these criteria, there are four approaches from cognitive-structural perspectives of moral development that appear particularly germane to the question of educating for personal and social responsibility: Kohlberg's "just-community approach"; Berkowitz's descriptions of sociomoral discourse based on Kohlberg's model; Knefelkamp and Widick's Developmental Instruction Variables (DIV) based on the Perry scheme; and Chickering and Reisser's description of influences on the vector of developing integrity during the college years.

Kohlberg's just-community approach was developed through an experiment in democratic governance at a public alternative high school in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cluster School, which was housed within Cambridge High School, was established in 1974 with sixty students in grades nine through twelve and eight staff members, including teachers. Kohlberg himself served as a consultant for the school during its five-year existence. The hallmark of the Cluster School was the involvement of students in self-governance of the school; rather than teachers or administrators establishing rules and expecting compliance from students, all members of the school shared responsibility for crafting and enforcing group norms. This was accomplished through weekly two-hour meetings during which extensive discussion and voting on school issues of moral import occurred. In addition, the staff received training in Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning development.

Cluster School had as its goal "promoting individual development through building a

group-based moral atmosphere” (Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh 1983, 237). Kohlberg and his staff theorized that if students were given opportunities to learn and practice the complex forms of moral reasoning needed to create a morally just learning community, their individual moral development would benefit more than in a traditional high school setting (where immutable rules are established and enforced, typically without explanation or justification, by adult authorities). An additional assumption behind the school’s formation was that moral development can be enhanced through membership in a moral community in which the individual has a significant role or stake. Power et al. (1989) explain, “The just-community approach represents Kohlberg’s effort to balance ‘justice’ and ‘community’; to introduce the powerful appeal of the collective while both protecting the rights of individual students and promoting their moral growth” (53). Research shows that the just-community model achieved its goals, as measured by increases in moral reasoning along Kohlberg’s model. According to Power et al., assessment at Cluster and other alternative high schools employing Kohlberg’s approach confirmed that, when compared with typical high school settings, “significant mean changes [in moral reasoning] only occurred in schools oriented explicitly to just-community theory” (279).

In most institutions of higher education, it is not unusual to find elements of the just-community approach: student governments often hold significant decision-making power regarding campus life issues; and students often serve on disciplinary committees and even on faculty senates. Finding ways of integrating students further into the governance of colleges and universities, as well as creating a sense of student ownership of the campus community and moral climate, can potentially enhance development along the moral reasoning dimension of personal and social responsibility.

In addition to the just-community approach, concepts of sociomoral discourse arising

from Kohlberg's model figure prominently in the literature. In keeping with Piaget's notion of learning resulting from disequilibrium, Kohlberg's theory views moral development as occurring primarily through discussion with individuals in different (typically more advanced) stages of moral reasoning. Rather than focusing on the specific stages of participants or teachers' expertise in guiding moral discussions, Berkowitz (1984) advocates paying attention to the nature of the discussions themselves, as research suggests "the form that discussion takes is a significant predictor of whether the discussants will successfully develop higher levels of moral understanding" (6). Through Berkowitz's and others' research, a picture of how the discussion process encourages moral development emerges.

The form of moral conversation that appears to be most successful in fostering development in moral reasoning is "transactive" in nature. Berkowitz (1984) describes this type of conversation as involving participants who are "actively thinking about the reasoning of one's co-discussants and representing that in one's discourse behavior" (6). Berkowitz and Grych (1998) explain that this type of discussion "consists of speech acts in which the speaker represents (e.g., paraphrases) or actively operates on (e.g., analyses, extends, logically critiques) the reasoning of a co-discussant" (380). Research has shown that the latter type of acts—those that are "operational" and require greater engagement with others' reasoning—typically generate greater gains in moral reasoning on Kohlberg's model. In terms of actual prevalence of these discussion forms in higher education, Berkowitz (1984) reports that 20 to 25 percent of moral discourse among undergraduates is transactive in nature, with only 15 percent constituting operational discourse, the "most developmentally productive type" (9).

The major implication of these findings for higher education is that merely engaging in discussion about moral issues is not sufficient for substantial growth in moral reasoning. Instead,

educators should attend to the developmental quality of moral discussions. Berkowitz (1985) makes the observation that while teachers are often trained to facilitate moral conversation, it is generally assumed that students do not need such training. Instruction in different discussion techniques and ways of engaging with others' viewpoints, when combined with opportunities to practice such skills, can help students to more fully benefit from—and develop further through—moral discourse in higher education.

In addition to Kohlberg's model of moral development, the Perry scheme also has an associated model of curricular and pedagogical design. Knefelkamp and Widick conceptualize a model of Developmental Instruction Variables (DIV) based on Perry's work in order to, as Knefelkamp (1999) states, "understand the underlying characteristics of the student-as-learner so that we could design instructional environments that were characterized by a balance of intellectual challenges and supports" (xxiv). This model provides a valuable framework for understanding interaction between students' positions in the Perry scheme and the actual and potential influence of the learning environment. Thus development is seen not as occurring in a vacuum, but rather in conjunction with conditions created by educational contexts.

Knefelkamp (1999) describes *structure*, *experiential learning*, *level of diversity*, and *personalism* as four educational variables that—depending on a student's position within the Perry scheme and the learning needs inherent in that position—can be adjusted in each class to help facilitate growth and development. The first variable, the amount of *structure* in the course, involves setting a context for the class in light of the overall curriculum as well as providing guidelines for learning tasks. The second variable, *experiential learning*, entails making connections between what students are learning in class and students' own lived experiences through activities such as service learning, case studies, and role playing. The third variable, the

level of *diversity* experienced, is characterized by exposure to diverse content (multiple viewpoints and ideas) and diverse pedagogy (a variety of assignments and evaluation methods); in addition, appropriate sequencing of material and assignments in order of increasing complexity can help students gradually recognize and appreciate the diversity in the course. The final variable, *personalism*, is described by Knefelkamp as “the degree to which the class could be characterized as respectful, collaborative, and able to relate the subject matter to the context of the students’ lives” (xxiv). Classrooms that have an adequate degree of personalism provide the safe conditions necessary for listening to, reasoning about, and critiquing of others’ perspectives. Research has demonstrated that the use of the DIV in curriculum design is an effective means of promoting development along the Perry scheme (Knefelkamp and Cornfeld 1977, Swick et al. 1991). In addition, Mason (1978) examined the effects of a DIV sequence on the development of first-year graduate students’ cognitive complexity, locus of control, and development of empathy, and found that changes in all three were “statistically significant and in the predicted direction. The students as a group became more cognitively complex, more internally controlled and more empathic” (abstract, 2). Powell (1983) found similar results with the psychological “construct of responsibility” (118) for the same sample of students. These findings support the use of DIV as a promising model for curricular and pedagogical design aimed at developing personal and social responsibility.

Chickering and Reisser (1993) also describe key institutional, pedagogical, curricular, and extracurricular influences on the vector of developing integrity during the college years. Institutional influences include presenting clear and consistent objectives and balancing institutional size with opportunities for learning. Pedagogical influences involve teaching that promotes active learning, as well as student-faculty relationships that are “frequent and friendly”

(269), which in turn help to develop mutual respect and healthy views of authority. Curricular influences include crafting a formal curriculum that is “educationally powerful,” as well as paying attention to and shaping multiple hidden curricula (e.g., student learning, value-based curricular assumptions). Extracurricular influences on the development of integrity include student participation in campus communities and partnerships between student development professionals and faculty.

Domain Perspectives

While a comprehensive model for domain-based education for personal and social responsibility in higher education is not fully articulated in the literature, some salient principles are offered by Nucci (2001). Given that a domain approach to moral education emphasizes the division of development into both moral and conventional realms, Nucci describes the design of a domain-based curriculum as follows:

The purposes of this curricular approach are (1) to stimulate the development of students’ moral conceptions of fairness, human welfare, and rights, and (2) to develop their conceptions of societal convention and social organization so that they may (3) participate as constructive citizens and moral beings and (4) develop a critical moral orientation toward their own conduct and the norms and mores of society (169).

These purposes are achieved by educating students in domain-specific ways and by developing students’ ability to recognize the specific domains to which particular issues, dilemmas, or values belong.

As evidence for the effectiveness of such an approach, Nucci (2001) cites research with three groups of eighth graders, each of which was given identical issues and dilemmas to analyze. Each group was taught how to conduct analysis from a particular domain-specific approach: the first group from a moral approach, the second group from a

conventional approach, and the third group from both moral and conventional (titled “domain appropriate”) approaches. Results indicate that students “who received instruction focusing in one domain developed in that domain and not the other. Only the students in the Domain Appropriate instructional condition developed in both domains” (172). In addition, only students in the domain appropriate group were able to recognize that issues had both moral and conventional dimensions and to analyze issues from both domains. Nucci concludes, “These results indicate that attention to domain does matter in terms of efforts to impact on students’ social-conceptual development” (171).

In applying educational concepts from domain theory to higher education, educators should consider the criticism that there are most likely multiple domains of development inherent in personal and social responsibility, rather than just moral and conventional. Domain theory may perhaps be useful, therefore, in helping students to recognize the need for delineating between moral and other types of issues or dilemmas they encounter. Along these lines, curricular and pedagogical efforts can help students explore what criteria might make an issue or action inherently moral, as well as consider the various effects of social convention or personal choice on morality. Such efforts may help students to recognize and act reflectively on the complexity of their moral worlds, choices, and behaviors.

Affective Perspectives

Like Hoffman (2000), who focuses on empathy as the primary dimension of moral development, Noddings (2002) asserts that moral emotions are central to morality and that these emotions manifest themselves through the moral action of caring. From this care-centered

perspective, Noddings explains that care theorists who are designing educational environments “believe that reason is (almost) slave to the passions. The educational task, then, is to educate the passions, especially the moral sentiments” (8). Because Noddings (1992) claims that caring “is a way of being in relation, not a set of specific behaviors” (17), she concludes that the most important way to educate for moral development is to foster morally healthy relationships with others who care about the individual.

Noddings explains that, fundamentally, “the model of moral education developed through care ethics is process-oriented. It involves modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation” (148). Stories are a primary means of accomplishing these goals and nurturing caring in students. Storytelling can be utilized in different types of educational conversations, such as the “Immortal Conversation” shared by all humans across time: “Matters of birth, death, cruelty, pain, misfortune, love, good fortune—all the topics central to fairy tales, legends, and religions—are of interest to people everywhere, and they get far too little attention in schools obsessed with short answers and the accumulation of information” (136). By incorporating such stories in the curriculum and facilitating discussions about the models of care they provide, students can be encouraged to enter this moral conversation themselves. In addition, Noddings claims that ordinary conversation is a generative place for storytelling, though such conversation is often avoided in schools and viewed as a distraction or inappropriate between teachers and students. Noddings illustrates the process by which ordinary conversations “reveal care, promote trust, and invite remembrance” (144):

As students and teachers slip into ordinary conversation, they learn about one another. But they also learn *from* one another. Without imposing their values, teachers can convey all sorts of messages about respect, taste, choice, time management, humor, human foibles, fears, disappointments. It is hard to exaggerate how much it might mean to a particular student to hear a teacher say, “That happened

to me once too.” And sometimes students disclose things about themselves that change the opinion of a teacher drastically (142).

As for the concern that such conversation diminishes the seriousness of the educational environment or invites disruptive behavior, Noddings claims, “In a rich learning environment, however, students regard ordinary conversations as a mark of respect” (146). Ultimately, Noddings explains, caring conversations with others in educational settings—both peers and authorities—provide important moral lessons regarding community membership: “These conversations are essential to moral life. They are part of moral education because when they are properly conducted, we learn through them how to meet and treat one another” (146).

Although care theorists focus on the moral development of young children, Noddings asserts that both moral development and the responsibility of educating for morality continue after childhood: “[O]ur obligation does not end with the moral education of children . . . we remain at least partly responsible for the moral development of each person we encounter” (14). Considering aspects of care theory and care-oriented education may therefore be of value to educating for personal and social responsibility in higher education. Many residence halls, student organizations, and other student-life forums often seek to provide caring environments for students as well as personal connections with the campus community; these efforts can be strengthened and legitimized as a central part of the institution’s educative mission. Further, many college classes focus solely on cognitive comprehension of subject matter and neglect the affective dimensions inherent in the learning process, perhaps because faculty—and even students—are uncomfortable addressing emotional content. Noddings’s recommendations regarding storytelling and conversation can be helpful in developing a sense of care and empathy in the classroom. In addition, Noddings (1992) asserts that providing continuity for students is

key for moral development. In higher education settings, the use of academic and residential learning communities, as well as assignment to the same academic or faculty adviser each year, are all possible ways of developing continuity. And at a macro level, institutions of higher education can analyze their practices to determine whether they provide a caring environment for students. If so, students may be better able to develop a caring stance and practice empathic behaviors necessary for moral life.

In addition to Noddings's recommendations for nurturing care in educational settings, some empirical evidence in the literature points to the possibility of educating for empathy during the college years. Specifically, Hatcher et al. (1994) report findings from their study of high school and college students enrolled in a behavioral psychology course, in which an experimental group also participated in a peer-facilitated curriculum emphasizing the development of empathy-related skills. Using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), the authors observed a significantly higher positive change in empathy scores among the college students in the peer-facilitated curriculum as compared to the control group. Thus, there is evidence that educational interventions designed to facilitate the development of empathy at the college level show promise.

Social Learning Perspectives

When considered from a social learning perspective, development of personal and social responsibility is dependent upon students' observation of others in the environment. Multiple constituencies on the college campus—such as faculty, staff, and peers—can model, teach, and reinforce moral behavior for students. Moral education from a social learning standpoint, then, involves providing positive moral models for students as well as reinforcing morally desirable

behavior.

Extensive research on academic dishonesty lends support to a social learning perspective of moral development. From their examination of the influences on academic dishonesty, McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield (2002) report:

[S]ignificant relationships exist between academic dishonesty and a variety of contextual variables . . . [including] perception of peers' behavior, student perceptions of the understanding and acceptance of academic integrity policies, the perceived certainty of being reported for cheating, and the perceived severity of campus penalties for cheating, as well as the presence or absence of an academic honor code (359).

The authors cite perception of peers' behaviors as the most powerful influence, and explain that social learning theory seems to be the "most important" means of explaining this relationship (359). This is in keeping with Astin's (1993) findings regarding peers' role in moral development: "*[P]eer group is the single most potent source of influence on growth and development during the undergraduate years . . . students' values, beliefs, and aspirations tend to change in the direction of the dominant values, beliefs, and aspirations of the peer group*" (398). McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield claim that faculty also serve as role models for moral behavior, and that "the extent to which an institution's policy is understood and accepted by faculty may also be an important influence on student behavior . . . lack of acceptance and adherence to the institutions' policy by faculty may lead to more cheating" (360).

In addition to campus constituencies who serve as models for moral behavior, institutional policies—such as honor codes, which address academic dishonesty—can help to shape students' development of personal and social responsibility. McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield conducted research on academic dishonesty at three types of campuses: those with traditional honor codes, those with "modified" honor codes, and those with no honor code.

Prevalent at small liberal arts colleges, traditional honor codes provided one or more of the following: unproctored exams; written honor pledges; judicial bodies comprised of peers; and reportage of violations by students. At larger public institutions, where traditional honor codes are not often feasible, the elements of modified honor codes were described as follows:

First, the institution, through any number of mechanisms (e.g., integrity rallies, presidential involvement, integrity seminars), clearly communicates to its students that academic integrity is a major institutional priority. Second, students are given a significant role both in the judicial or hearing body on campus and in developing programs to inform other students about the purposes of the code, its major components, enforcement strategies, and so forth (362-63).

When comparing the results of their research at each type of campus, the authors found that “the level of academic dishonesty is highest at colleges that do not have honor codes, is moderate at modified code institutions, and is lowest at schools with traditional honor codes” (368). Cole and McCabe (1996) postulate that these findings are not simply due to the presence of an honor code on campus. Rather, honor codes are typically indicative of a campus climate and culture that articulates and demonstrates its value of academic honesty to students. Cast in the language of social learning theory, these types of colleges also reinforce behavioral standards by involving students and faculty in disciplining offenders as well as developing proactive strategies for reducing academic dishonesty.

How then might colleges and universities utilize the principles of social learning theory to educate for personal and social responsibility? McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield (2002) suggest that, first and foremost, institutions of higher education should promote a positive peer culture that models moral behavior for other students:

From a social learning standpoint . . . [colleges] should do more to ensure that their students have suitable peer role models . . . if students see their peers engaging in prosocial behaviors such as designing and enforcing academic integrity policies, making pledges regarding personal integrity, educating other students about the

importance of academic integrity, and behaving honestly, then cheating may be less likely (373).

It can be posited that this principle would extend beyond issues of academic dishonesty to other areas of moral behavior, such as drug and alcohol use, criminal behavior, violence on campus, and so forth. In addition to peers, faculty also serve as powerful models of moral behavior for students; thus, campuses can ensure that faculty are carefully selected and receive adequate support for their roles through training and development.

Finally, institutions can strive to create communities that are moral. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1990), in the landmark report *Campus Life: In Search of Community*, asserts that “the kind of community every college and university should strive to be” (7) is one that is just, disciplined, and caring, in addition to having other attributes. Along these lines, campuses can implement policies that teach moral standards and procedures that reinforce desirable behavior. Institutions can consider adopting an honor code to address academic dishonesty issues, as well as a student conduct code to set standards for a wide range of behavioral areas. If adequately publicized, such codes can send a powerful message to the entire campus community regarding institutional values and expectations. Furthermore, campus constituencies—including students, faculty, and staff—can be involved in reinforcing positive behavior through service on disciplinary committees and design teams for prevention programs.

Integrative Perspectives

Integrative perspectives of educating for personal and social responsibility are defined in this review as those that: 1) address multiple elements of the moral person; and 2) utilize multiple approaches in their educational efforts. Three such models pertaining to higher education—those of Whiteley and Yokota (1988, 1999), Berkowitz and Fekula (1999), and

Colby et al. (2003)—are presented here in order of ascending scope, depth, and value to broad-based inquiry on how colleges and universities can educate for personal and social responsibility.

Whiteley and Yokota (1988; Whiteley et al. 1999) discuss an integrative model of educating for moral development called the Sierra Project, a curriculum intervention and longitudinal research study at University of California-Irvine initiated in the 1970s. The authors describe the purpose of the project as follows: “The Sierra Project presents a curriculum designed to develop in university students a greater capacity for ethical sensitivity and awareness, an increased regard for equity in human relationships, and the ability to translate this enhanced capacity and regard into a higher standard of fairness and concern for the common good in all realms of their lives” (12). The project involved first-year students who were equally balanced in terms of gender and racial and ethnic background and who lived together in the same residence hall. In addition to the residential component, the students attended a four-unit class for the entire first year comprised of ten instructional modules: college survival skills, community building, conflict resolution, empathy and social perspective taking, socialization, sex-role choices, race roles, assertion training, life and career planning, and experiential community service. These modules were intended to educate for both moral reasoning skills and ego development. Whiteley and Yokota (1988) report that students experienced significant gains in moral reasoning over the course of the freshman year and their undergraduate experience, even as compared to control groups at the university. While the authors were not able to obtain comprehensive data for ego development, the students did report higher levels of a sense of community and of close relationships with faculty and staff. These findings may have contributed to project students’ higher graduation rate (60 percent) as compared with the campus

average (44 percent). The authors conclude that “the Sierra curriculum can make a moderate contribution toward furthering character development in college freshmen during a year in their lives which would normally include a small but persistent gain the level of moral reasoning” (26). Although the program assessment focused on moral judgment, the overall program can be considered as integrative because it educated for multiple dimensions of the moral self—such as judgment, empathy and values—and also utilized an integrative approach that included academic and residential components. This limited (one-dimensional) assessment of a comprehensive (multidimensional) program will be discussed further in the section on assessing value added.

Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) also describe a comprehensive approach to character education at the college level. The authors explain that while there is a strong emphasis on character education in elementary and secondary school, there is “relatively little attention paid to character on U.S. college campuses” (17). Their recommendations for postsecondary character education are based on Berkowitz’s concept of the moral anatomy: “We define character development as the growth of those aspects of the individual that represent his or her ethical worth, including behavior, cognition, affect, values, personality, identity, and skills that are not moral themselves but support moral functioning” (18). Just as the authors view character as comprising multiple elements of the individual, they propose that character education in higher education should address each of these elements and be integrated throughout all aspects of the institution:

[I]nstitutions that want to engage in truly comprehensive character education must put in place a wide array of elements and implement them throughout the educational environment. . . . it is essential that character education be understood as a pervasive, multifaceted, institutional endeavor based on a clear vision of the moral person and core values (18).

The authors discuss five approaches for accomplishing these goals of character development in

higher education. In keeping with theory and research on moral reasoning, institutions can *teach about character* by addressing ethics across the curriculum, espousing moral values (e.g., in mission statements), and providing special programs or publications related to character issues. Two of the authors' recommendations arise from social learning theory. First, institutions can *display character* through modeling of behavior: "Role-modeling by adults and peer leaders in the university environment needs to be ubiquitous, and these individuals need to understand the power of even their unreflective casual behaviors" (20). Second, colleges can *demand character* by setting standards in honor codes and student conduct codes and enforcing those codes when violations occur. In addition, institutions can offer apprenticeships—or opportunities to *practice character*—through democratic governance, service learning, and experiential learning. Finally, students can *reflect on character* through mentoring relationships, service learning, journals, and academic programs that foster discussion of character-related or ethical issues.

In addition to these five approaches, Berkowitz and Fekula recommend two major administrative steps toward comprehensive character education that institutions can take. Establishment of a central office—staffed with both student affairs and academic affairs personnel—can provide the dedicated resources needed for coordination of character education efforts. In addition, colleges and universities can conduct a needs assessment of their institution that involves "an ethics audit of one's institution, a self-study of character-promoting elements (or lack thereof), and an identification of institutional impediments to effective character education" (22). Colleges and universities can then build upon their understanding of institutional culture and its effect on character development with unique educational approaches that are tailored to institutional mission, values, and needs.

Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of educating for personal and social

responsibility at the college level is provided by Colby et al. (2003) in *Educating Citizens: Preparing America's Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic Responsibility*. This discussion is particularly useful because it is based on best practices observed through in-depth study of twelve institutions that, in the authors' words, have made "moral and civic development a high priority and have created a wealth of curricular and extracurricular programs to stimulate and support that development" (9). These institutions' efforts toward educating for personal and social responsibility are described as being "intentional, holistic, and designed to reach all of their students . . . this more comprehensive, intentional approach has a greater impact on more students" (277). From their study of these colleges and universities, the authors describe three basic principles that "are offered as a framework for strengthening efforts currently in place and for planning future guidelines" (278) in higher education.

The first principle, entitled *Developmental Goals and Dimensions*, involves institutions' engaging the multiple dimensions of the moral person, including moral and civic understanding (moral judgment, ethical and civic concepts), moral and civic motivation (emotions, values, and moral identity), and moral and civic skills (abilities related to communication, collaboration, compromise, and motivation, as well as democratic participation). Inherent in this principle is the importance of not focusing on a single moral dimension to the neglect of others.

The second principle, *Sites of Moral and Civic Education*, involves institutions' utilizing multiple forums in which educating for personal and social responsibility can occur, such as the curriculum, extracurricular experiences, and campus culture. In considering the curriculum as a site for learning, institutions can integrate moral education throughout all courses and majors, endorse a variety of pedagogical approaches, encourage experiential learning and group work with complex issues, develop outcomes-based competencies as graduation requirements, provide

tenured and nontenured faculty with training and support, and establish campus centers to coordinate such educational efforts. Beyond the classroom, institutions can provide educational experiences through extracurricular programs (e.g., service learning and leadership training), precollege experiences (e.g., orientation), and postcollege experiences for alumni. Finally, campus cultures—which encompass elements like “physical symbols, iconic stories, socialization practices, and widely shared ideas” (282)—can be examined for messages they convey to campus community members about personal and social responsibility.

In the third and final principle, *Thematic Perspectives*, Colby et al. present three major themes—community connections, moral and civic virtue, and systemic social responsibility—they identified across the twelve institutions in their study. The theme of community connections involves students’ membership in multiple communities, understanding responsibilities of membership, and desire and ability to contribute to these communities. Moral and civic virtue entails support for the central values of higher education, which “include intellectual integrity and concern for truth, mutual respect and tolerance, open-mindedness, concern for both the rights and the welfare of individuals and the community, and commitment to rational discourse and procedural fairness” (184). The theme of systemic social responsibility involves students’ participation in all aspects of the democratic process. Although these three themes were present at the institutions studied, Colby et al. explain that the level of emphasis on each theme differed with the unique character of the institution.

Educating for Responsibility: Future Directions

Unresolved issues, as well as future directions for research, have been highlighted throughout this discussion of educating for personal and social responsibility. They are summarized here by the three major areas addressed in this section.

- *What Happens in College?* The majority of evidence for development of personal and social responsibility in college comes from research related to cognitive-structural perspectives, such as moral reasoning development. Very little is known about development during college of the remaining elements of Berkowitz's (1997) moral anatomy, among them moral character, values, emotion, and identity. Furthermore, while the problematic nature of moral behavior on campus has been well catalogued, the connection between such behavior and these moral elements is unclear and largely unexamined. An understanding of this connection would prove helpful in understanding if and how moral education could positively affect behavioral outcomes.

- *Is it Our Business?* From what evidence is available in the literature, it is clear that moral growth and development does indeed occur in college. However, because it is not uncommon for educators and students to be uncomfortable with addressing moral issues, colleges and universities cannot assume that buy-in for moral education efforts will be automatic or enthusiastic. Rather, institutions need to carefully consider and elucidate their grounds for engaging in efforts to enhance personal and social responsibility. While broad justifications for moral education can and should be further identified for higher education as an overall enterprise, each individual institution will likely have a unique set of values, and thereby reasons, behind its educational approach. Any research proposal or endeavor should likewise be certain to articulate its rationale for seeking to promote personal and social responsibility during the college years.

- *Educating from the Five Perspectives.* Each perspective offers a unique set of insights regarding ways to educate for personal and social responsibility. From the cognitive-structural perspective, educational approaches involving democratic governance, sociomoral discourse, developmental instruction, and various institutional influences can have positive effects on moral reasoning development in college. From a domain perspective emerges the importance of helping students learn to delineate the moral domain, thereby defining for themselves what and how issues or behaviors are considered moral. From an affective perspective, colleges and universities can create environments that are caring and, in turn, help students learn to be empathic and carers themselves; in addition, specific interventions designed to teach empathy-related skills show promise of success. The social learning perspective underscores the critical role of peers, faculty, and institutional policy, and is the perspective that most directly addresses environmental factors affecting moral behavior; as this link with behavior is at the core of social learning theory, this approach may provide an interesting model for future research that seeks to examine educational efforts and their impact on moral behavior. Finally, as with theory building discussed earlier, integrative perspectives may be the most generative for future efforts because they consider multiple dimensions of the moral person and employ multiple educational approaches. These integrative perspectives are also comprehensive starting points for institutions looking to implement broad-based educational efforts in the area of personal and social responsibility.

III. Assessing Value Added

Berkowitz (2002), in a discussion of next steps for the field of character education, comments that “many questions remain unanswered,” and chief among these is the question of how to “most effectively measure character” (62-63). In the following section, the question of assessing higher education’s value added for personal and social responsibility will be addressed through a description of the major instruments in current use, the limitations of existing instruments, and the directions for future assessment efforts focused on personal and social responsibility.

Cognitive-Structural Measurements

As mentioned previously, the vast majority of measurements utilized to assess personal and social responsibility have arisen from cognitive-structural theories of moral development. In most cases, the development and refinement of these measurements has been well documented, sufficient reliability and validity have been demonstrated, and applicability to multiple and diverse populations has been established (often through literally hundreds of studies). For the purposes of this review, detailed information along these lines will not be provided, though readers will be directed to sources where such data can be found. Instead, general information on the format and use of each test will be discussed, in order to give a sense of the current measurements used to examine cognitive-structural aspects of personal and social responsibility. The following constitute the primary forms of instrumentation currently in use: the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI); Defining Issues Test (DIT); Sociomoral Reflection Measure Short-

Form (SRM-SF); Ethic of Care Interview (ECI); Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO); Measure of Intellectual Development (MID); Learning Environment Preferences (LEP); Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI); Sentence Completion Test (SCT); and Student Developmental Task and Lifestyle Assessment (SDTLA). Each of these instruments can be described as either quantitative or qualitative in nature, as well as either production-type (in that subjects are asked to provide their own response to questions) or recognition-type (in that subjects must rank order or similarly evaluate statements).

Moral Judgment Interview (MJI)

The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), developed by Kohlberg and his associates, is a structured interview measurement that provides an assessment of subjects' development in stages one through five of Kohlberg's moral reasoning scheme (for a detailed discussion, see Colby and Kohlberg 1987). Utilizing an interview format, the MJI is a qualitative, production-style instrument. Three parallel forms of the MJI are in use, and each has three hypothetical moral dilemmas with standardized probes for clarifying subjects' reasoning. Among these is the oft-cited "Heinz dilemma": in this hypothetical situation, a man whose wife is dying of cancer must decide if he will steal a drug from a chemist who—simply because he wants to make money—is charging more than the man can pay. "Standard Issue Scoring" of the MJI involves categorizing subjects' responses first by two standard issue categories for each dilemma (for the Heinz dilemma, preservation of life or upholding the law), then by modal elements (upholding normative order) and value elements (egoistic consequences, utilitarian consequences, or fairness), and then by norms (life, property, truth, punishment, and so forth). A comprehensive

scoring manual (Colby et al. 1987) is used to generate a global stage score on Kohlberg's model for interviewees that can indicate mixed stage positionality in addition to pure stages.

Defining Issues Test (DIT)

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was developed by Rest and is a paper-and-pencil, recognition-type test based on Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning (for detailed discussions, see Rest 1979b and Rest et al. 1999). Perhaps the most common measure of moral development, the DIT has been used in well over 500 studies (King and Mayhew [2004] provide a comprehensive review of DIT research in higher education). The basic premises of the DIT are to present enough information regarding a moral dilemma to activate subjects' existing moral schemas, which in turn should guide subjects to respond consistently on the test, and thereby reveal their level of moral reasoning. The DIT includes six moral dilemmas, including the Heinz dilemma. The basic structure of the DIT is to present each moral dilemma and then ask subjects to indicate which of the two actions or resolutions to the dilemma they endorse. Next, the DIT presents twelve stage-prototypic statements for each dilemma and asks subjects to rank each statement—in terms of importance to their decision—on a five-item Likert scale. Finally, subjects rank the statement that is most important in their thinking, as well as second, third, and fourth in importance. Although several indices were developed to report scores, the most widely used is the “P” index, which measures the percentage of principled moral reasoning.

Recently, the DIT was revised and reformulated into the DIT-2. The DIT-2 features more modern social dilemmas, including a father stealing food for his starving family, a newspaper reporter exposing a favored political candidate's criminal background, a school board holding a contentious and dangerous meeting, a doctor giving an overdose of painkillers to a suffering

patient, and college students demonstrating against U.S. foreign policy. The format is the same as the DIT; however a new—or “N2”—index has been developed and is considered to be more powerful than the traditional “P” index.

Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF)

Gibbs’s Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) is a paper-and-pencil, production-style measure that assesses maturity of sociomoral reflection. Subjects’ maturity level is measured by scoring their justifications for moral behaviors such as promise keeping, telling the truth, helping parents, saving a friend, and obeying the law (for a detailed discussion, see Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller 1992). For each of eleven questions related to these behaviors, subjects indicate whether that behavior is very important, important, or not important to them, and then are asked to describe their reason for this decision in short-essay form. The SRM-SF is based on previous instruments designed by Gibbs, for which the major hallmark is the replacement of hypothetical moral dilemmas with subjects’ evaluation—via level of importance—of moral behaviors. A major limitation of the SRM-SF for use with college-level students is that it was primarily designed for children and low-literacy subjects; thus, the questions are somewhat simplistic and more age-appropriate for younger subjects.

Ethic of Care Interview (ECI)

Based on Gilligan’s theory of moral development, the Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) is a qualitative measure of subjects’ positionality on Gilligan’s developmental scheme and, as it involves a semi-structured interview, is a production-style instrument (for a detailed discussion, see Skoe and Marcia 1991). First, subjects are asked to describe a real-life dilemma and their response to this dilemma. Then, subjects are asked to respond to three hypothetical dilemmas

dealing with unplanned pregnancy, marital fidelity, and care for a parent. Each of these dilemmas involves interpersonal conflicts that present issues related to balancing concerns of self and others. Probing questions are asked by the interviewer and address the participant's descriptions of and actions in the situation, as well as perceptions of whether the actions were the right ones. Responses are scored for their correspondence with Gilligan's levels and transitions.

Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO)

Also based on Gilligan's theory, the Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) is a paper-and-pencil instrument developed to measure strength of care and justice orientation (for a detailed discussion, see Liddell and Davis 1996). Specifically intended for college students, the MMO is comprised of eight moral dilemmas as well as a fourteen-item self-description measurement, and utilizes a four-point Likert scale to indicate agreement with item statements. Thus, the MMO is a quantitative and recognition-style instrument. First, students are asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist of the moral dilemmas (which are situations common to college students, such as roommate conflicts) and then respond to items that reflect either a justice or care orientation. Next, the self-description measure assesses students' perceptions of themselves as caring or just through items addressing decision making, ideal self, and so forth. Scoring of the instrument involves totaling the values for care and justice items for four scales: care; justice; self-description of care; and self-description of justice. The higher the score on the individual scale, the greater the participant's orientation toward the construct of that scale.

Measure of Intellectual Development (MID)

Developed by Knepfkamp and Widick, the Measure of Intellectual Development (MID) is an essay-based test designed to assess college students' positionality on the Perry scheme (for

a detailed discussion, see Mentkowski, Moeser, and Strait 1983). As a qualitative and production-style instrument, the MID consists of four questions to which students respond in essay format. By utilizing these four short essays, the MID easily facilitates administration in a classroom setting. Students are asked to write an essay for each of the following: the best course they have taken; their perception of the ideal learning experience for them; their learning in the particular course or program in which they are taking the MID; and their approaches to career planning and vocational decision making. Evaluation of the essays involves independent rating by two trained raters. Scoring is provided in terms of a three-digit stage description—from Perry scheme positions one (basic dualism) through five (contextual relativism)—that shows dominant positions as well as transition between stages. For example, a student who has a dominant standpoint in Early Multiplicity (Position 3) but appears to be transitioning to Late Multiplicity (Position 4) would be scored as 334. Similarly, a student who has a dominant standpoint of Contextual Relativism (Position 5) but still evidences late multiplistic thinking would be scored as 455. Mentkowski, Moeser, and Strait (1983) provide a comprehensive guide to the extensive rating system used at Alverno College for the MID.

Learning Environment Preferences (LEP)

Developed by Moore, the Learning Environment Preferences (LEP) is a quantitative, recognition-style instrument designed for use with undergraduates that assesses positionality on the Perry scheme (for a detailed discussion, see Moore 1989). The LEP is divided into the following five domains or aspects of the subject's "ideal learning environment": course content; instructor's role; student's role; classroom atmosphere and activities; and evaluation procedures. For each domain, the LEP asks students to conceptualize their ideal learning environment and

rank thirteen possible responses indicating their preferences for that domain. These responses are typical of Perry positions (similar to the DIT's stage prototypic statements) and are derived from the MID. The ranking process consists of two parts: first, students utilize a four-item Likert scale to indicate the significance of each response in their ideal learning environment; and second, students rank—for each domain—the three most important items. A scoring index yields scores between 200 and 500, which correlate with Perry positions 2 through 5. Additionally, similar to the DIT's "P" index, the LEP's "R" index indicates the percentage of the student's thinking that is characterized by Position 5 (Contextual Relativism) on the Perry scheme.

Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI)

The Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI)—a qualitative, semi-structured, and production-type interview format—was utilized to collect data for King and Kitchener's Reflective Judgment Model (for a detailed discussion, see King and Kitchener 1994). The RJI consists of five questions regarding ill-structured problems that are presented from two contradicting points of view on the following questions: how the Egyptian pyramids were constructed; whether objectivity is possible in news reporting; how humans came into existence; whether chemical additives are beneficial for the food supply; and whether nuclear energy is inherently valuable or dangerous. In addition, several discipline-based problems for psychology, business and chemistry were developed. For each question, subjects are asked to state and justify their opinion on the issue and then respond to six follow-up questions (exploring further descriptions of the subject's point of view, how the subject arrived at that view, and the subject's assessment of the correctness of this view). During King and Kitchener's research, two certified raters scored subjects' responses and summarized the ratings into a three-digit score representing stages on the

Reflective Judgment Model. The authors explain that the RJI uses problems for which the moral dimension is not central (as opposed to the Heinz dilemma); however, the RJI does provide information on how students think and arrive at judgments about ill-structured, complex issues.

Sentence Completion Test (SCT)

Loevinger and Wessler's Sentence Completion Test (SCT) is a qualitative, production-type instrument that assesses positionality on Loevinger's model of ego development (for a detailed discussion, see Hy and Loevinger 1996). The most current and common versions, Form 81 for Women and Form 81 for Men, are each comprised of 36 sentence stems. Sentence stems are comprised of the beginning word or few words of a sentence for which the subject is essentially asked to fill in the blank. Examples of stems on the current SCT include: "Education . . ."; "I feel sorry . . ."; "Rules are . . ."; "Crime and delinquency could be halted . . ."; "My main problem is . . ."; and "My conscience bothers me. . . ." Hy and Loevinger (1996) claim that though the test forms for women and men differ slightly (for example, by a changed pronoun), the rater manual is "unisex" (26) as while men and women may respond differently to items, it has not been proven that a given response should receive a different score because of gender. Trained raters score the instrument and use "ogive" rules to derive total protocol ratings (TPR) on Loevinger's model.

While the SCT does appear to address dimensions that are pertinent to personal and social responsibility, it is not widely used in research assessing moral development or involving college student development. A notable exception is Alverno College, which uses the SCT as part of its comprehensive, longitudinal assessment of undergraduates and alumnae. However, Reisetter Hart and Mentkowski (1994) report that their findings at Alverno confirm other studies

observing stability during college on Loevinger's model at the Self-Aware level (though progression to the Conscientious level was observed for alumnae). Reissetter Hart and Mentkowski call this "curious" (3) as Loevinger's comprehensive model purports to take into account changes in moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg's model), which indeed does appear to change significantly in college. Reissetter Hart and Mentkowski recommend further research into contextual and environmental elements to better understand ego development during college; however, by itself, the SCT does not appear to provide significant insight into change in ego development during the college years.

Student Developmental Task and Lifestyle Assessment (SDTLA)

The Student Developmental Task and Lifestyle Assessment (SDTLA) was developed and revised numerous times at the University of Georgia for use in counseling with students (for a detailed discussion of the version immediately preceding the SDTLA—the Student Developmental Task and Lifestyle Inventory, or SDTLI—see Winston, Miller, and Prince 1987). The paper-and-pencil, quantitative instrument is based on Chickering's theory of development, but does not exactly correspond to the theory's vectors and also includes additional developmental tasks identified through research with the instrument. Various forms of the SDTLA are available, but the most comprehensive version is comprised of 153 items and assesses the developmental tasks of Establishing and Clarifying Purpose (with four subtasks of Educational Involvement, Career Planning, Lifestyle Planning, and Cultural Participation), Developing Mature Interpersonal Relationships (with two subtasks of Peer Relationships and Tolerance), and Developing Autonomy (with four subtasks of Emotional Autonomy, Academic Autonomy, Instrumental Autonomy, and Interdependence). In addition, the SDTLA includes two

scales, the Salubrious Lifestyle Scale (assessing health and wellness practices) and the Response Bias Scale.

Two concerns with utilizing the SDTLA in assessing personal and social responsibility at the college level have been put forward: it is limited to the developmental tasks typical of seventeen- to twenty-four-year-olds (thus it is not suitable for nontraditional students) and it lacks assessment along Chickering's vector of Developing Integrity, which is the vector most directly associated with moral development theory and research. However, some aspects of the instrument—such as measurements of the developmental tasks of Tolerance and Interdependence, and the Salubrious Lifestyle Scale (which can potentially reveal behavioral patterns)—may have some import for research on personal and social responsibility in college.

Instruments from Other Perspectives

Not many instruments from perspectives other than cognitive-structural are used as extensively or are as directly applicable to the question of personal and social responsibility development in college. However, a few measures can be identified in the literature that assess pertinent dimensions of the self such as affect, values, and behavior, as well as personality, style and interests.

Assessment of Affect

The major instruments used to assess affect—and in particular, the development or strength of an individual's capacity for empathy—include self-report measures and two questionnaires: the Mehrabian and Epstein Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendencies and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).

Batson (1987) describes self-report measures used to assess empathy functioning and development in adults as follows. Self-report questionnaires generally present a situation in which a person is in distress, and then ask subjects to respond to between ten and thirty adjectives that describe “possible emotional reactions to the situation—sympathetic, compassionate, alarmed, grieved, upset, softhearted, tender, and the like” (356). At that point, subjects rate the degree to which they perceive they are experiencing each emotion on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 or 1 to 9, with “not at all” or “extremely” as the endpoints of the scale. Batson describes multiple problems with these types of self-report measures, including subjects’ ability to accurately recognize and describe their emotions. Furthermore, there is often confusion by subjects and researchers about what the names of particular emotions connote; for example, Batson describes an empathic concern index from which both names “empathic” and “concern” were eventually dropped for this very reason. Finally, Batson reports research showing that instruments assessing “measures of empathy as a dispositional personality variable” (358) are often significantly affected by self-presentation bias, or subjects’ responding according to how they would like to be perceived as opposed to how they actually feel and behave.

The Mehrabian and Epstein Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendencies is a paper-and-pencil measure of empathy in adults (for a detailed discussion, see Mehrabian and Epstein 1972). Bryant (1987) describes this instrument as asking subjects to respond to thirty-three items on a +4 to -4 scale, from very strong agreement to very strong disagreement. Out of the thirty-three items, sixteen are designed so that agreement indicates an empathic response, and for seventeen items disagreement indicates an empathic response. Items are categorized by the following types: *external behavioral cues*, such as seeing someone crying; *internal emotional states* of others, such as seeing a depressed person; *situational cues*, such as witnessing someone

getting hurt; *general emotional atmospheres*, such as excitement surrounding the individual; and *salient psychological states* of persons, such as foreigners who are struggling to belong in a new country. A higher score on the instrument indicates greater empathy; Bryant explains, “This measure was designed, then, to be global in its consideration of empathy as a general disposition of perceived emotional responsiveness to others’ emotional experiences” (362). Bryant also reports that research demonstrates a positive relationship between empathy as measured by this instrument and altruism behaviors (helping others).

A second major questionnaire assessing affect is the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (for a detailed discussion, see Davis 1983). This twenty-eight-item questionnaire measures both cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy by asking subjects to rate each item on a five-point Likert scale from 0 (does not describe me well) to 4 (describes me very well). Factor analysis for the instrument involves four factors, two of which are cognitive and two of which are affective. The two cognitive factors are Perspective Taking (shifting from self- to other-oriented in reacting to another’s distress) and Fantasy (imagining the feelings of others). The two affective factors are Empathic Concern (having sympathy for another’s feelings) and Personal Distress (experiencing another’s distress as if it were one’s own). Each of these factors receives a separate score; summing scores is not recommended for the instrument, as its basic design assumes empathy is not a global trait but rather a set of factors. However, relationships between these four factors have been established through research: Perspective Taking and Fantasy appear to positively correlate with Empathic Concern, and Perspective Taking and Personal Distress appear to be inversely related. The IRI also registers gender differences: Hatcher et al. (1994) report that females tend to achieve higher empathy scores than males.

Strayer and Eisenberg (1987), in describing the general body of assessments available to measure empathy, state that “a multimodal approach seems to be the best approach for future investigations” (397). For this reason, they advise researchers that “more than one measure of empathy may be needed in any one study” (397). However, the authors also suggest that there are significant limitations and concerns with existing instruments that cannot be accounted for by using multiple measures: “We do not think that putting several poor measures together in one study is better than using one poor measure alone” (397). They recommend and point to the promising refinement of existing measures and development of new instruments “to assess the elusive phenomenon of empathy” (398).

Values-Based Assessments

The Values Scale (VS), developed by Super and Nevill (1986), presents subjects with twenty-one values related to work and life roles. These values include those of achievement, altruism, authority, autonomy, personal development, risk, social interaction, social relations, and cultural identity. For each value, subjects are asked to rate five items for their importance on a Likert scale of 1 to 4. Thus, each value has its own scale report that indicates the strength of importance of that value to the subject. Reliability is reported as fair for the instrument, due to the low number of items, and validity is cited as needing additional research.

The Value Survey, developed by Rokeach (1973), divides values into terminal values (which are desirable end states of being) and instrumental values (which are desirable modes of conduct). The Value Survey assesses eighteen of each type, for a total of thirty-six values. Terminal values include a comfortable life, sense of accomplishment, world at peace, equality, family security, freedom, pleasure, self-respect, and social recognition. Instrumental values

include being ambitious, broad-minded, courageous, forgiving, helpful, honest, logical, loving, obedient, responsible, and self-controlled. While these values are not defined on the test, each is accompanied by short phrase or synonym. The subject is asked to rank the eighteen terminal and eighteen instrumental values separately, in order of importance and status as a guiding principle in subject's life. No ties between values are allowed. The rank of each item becomes the score for that particular value, with lower score indicating a higher level of importance to the subject. Several problems have been noted regarding the Value Survey. Like the Values Scale, reliability for the Value Survey is lower than is desirable due to the low item size. In addition, the Value Survey is an ipsative measure, so all scores are relative to one another as opposed to measured absolutely; thus, the strength or magnitude of a particular value cannot be assessed.

In addition to these major value assessments, there are informal measurements of values that are commonly used in counseling and career development on college campuses to assist students with career and life planning. The majority of these tests, while certainly useful for practitioners in direct work with students, are not suitable for research purposes.

There are several critiques of values-based assessments that call into question their usefulness in research on personal and social responsibility at the college level. First, a general concern related to measurements of values, whether standardized or informal, is the issue of inclusiveness. It is difficult to determine whether a given assessment has an adequate number of values, or if the values are relevant to the population and study under consideration. A second critique is the general lack of definition of what constitutes a value, as well as how a particular value—for example, “freedom”—may be defined. Both of these concerns are relevant not only for test construction, but also for subjects who take the instrument; thus, value assessments do not allow for an in-depth exploration of the subject's understanding of what a value is or how the

subject defines a particular value. Therefore, value interests, in their present form, do not appear to be of considerable use in assessing personal and social responsibility at the college level.

Behavioral Assessments

Chief among assessments based on social learning theory is Rotter's Internal-External (I-E) Scale (for a detailed discussion, see Rotter 1966). The I-E Scale measures locus of control, or individuals' perceptions about the source of events in their lives. In the language of social learning theory, Rotter's test measures expectancies for reinforcement of events through internal control (dependent upon the subject's behavior) versus external control (dependent on the outside world). The assessment involves forced choice of two items paired in opposition, one of which is representative of an external locus of control and the other an internal locus of control. The subject's score represents the balance of internal to external responses. Reliability and validity have been established for the instrument, and extensive research has demonstrated the relationship between internal locus of control with positive outcomes such as academic success. The relationship between locus of control and moral behavior is unclear and largely unexamined; however, locus of control does provide insight into individuals' perceptions of events that happen to them, which hypothetically might, in turn, affect their ability for moral action or inaction in such situations.

There is also a plethora of assessments available to measure specific behaviors of college students, such as alcohol use, cheating, safe-sex practices, and so forth. While some of these measures simply assess the prevalence or severity of these behaviors, others examine factors in the environment—such as place of residence during college, membership in fraternities or sororities, or participation in athletic activities—and their relationship with specific behaviors.

The information generated by these assessments is certainly helpful in understanding the nature and scope of problematic behaviors in college and conceptualizing targeted intervention programs. However, as discussed earlier, information on behaviors in college is not particularly helpful to the question of educating for personal and social responsibility without an understanding of how these behaviors relate to other aspects of the moral self.

Personality, Style, and Interest Assessments

Several personality tests, style assessments, and interest inventories—such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and the Strong Interest Inventory, to name a few—are used at the college level to provide insight into various dimensions of subjects’ personalities and tendencies. While helpful in clinical or counseling settings, the relationship of these measures to personal and social responsibility in college is not clear. The question of how elements of personality and style relate to personal and social responsibility is an interesting one, especially if they are considered as part of a moral identity. However, these assessments—as they are currently used—do not generally provide information directly applicable to this question.

Limitations of Existing Instruments

A discussion of limitations of existing instruments begins first with what *can* be accomplished with current instrumentation, and then by considering what *cannot* be accomplished. This analysis will move beyond the usual considerations related to test construction and reliability and validity, because these are covered in depth in the literature and because the instruments’ theoretical and practical value to future research on personal and social responsibility is of more immediate interest. Likewise, a global look at the body of existing

instruments is presented, as opposed to a point-by-point comparison of the merits of each test—again to provide a sense of the strengths and limitations of available instrumentation as a whole.

The major strength of the current body of assessments is the ability to investigate various aspects of moral cognition. The bulk of measures assess positionality on Kohlberg’s model of moral reasoning (the MJI, DIT, SRM-SF) or incorporate elements of Gilligan’s model in describing justice and care orientations in moral reasoning (ECI, MMO). The majority of research conducted on moral development in higher education has been conducted using these measures—particularly the DIT—so a great deal is known about the moral reasoning development of multiple populations, in various settings, and through different educational approaches. The value of these types of instruments to future research lies in their ability to directly activate participants’ thinking about moral issues and to elicit descriptions of their reasoning in moral dilemmas. A major drawback of these instruments is their focus on hypothetical dilemmas and/or questions about what subjects “should” or “would” do in a moral situation; with the exception of the ECI, they do not ask for subjects to report their actual experiences with moral dilemmas or their reasoning in such situations. Thus, by nature of their design, these assessments may preclude the examination of the link between moral reasoning and behavior, as well as other elements of the moral person. Nonetheless, there is general agreement in the literature that cognition has a key role to play in moral development, and these instruments clearly provide an established means for examining this dimension of personal and social responsibility.

Unlike these dilemma-oriented measures, the instruments based on the Perry scheme (the MID and LEP) as well as the Reflective Judgment Model (the RJI) do not explicitly focus on moral reasoning. Instead, the Perry scheme—as well as the work of Belenky et al. on women’s

ways of knowing and the Reflective Judgment Model, which both have their foundation in the Perry scheme—describe the complexity of students’ ways of thinking, making meaning, and judging. Rather than asking direct questions about moral issues (e.g., like Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma), the MID, LEP and RJI get at students’ moral values through a discussion of their learning and thinking experiences. For example, students’ views of instructors speak to their views of authority (whether as absolute or fallible, external or internal); likewise, students’ views of subject matter often speak to their conceptions about knowledge (as grounded in absolute truth or as contextually relative, as concretely knowable or as constructed). These views are significant to any understanding of students’ moral thinking. Furthermore, rather than dealing with hypothetical situations, the MID and LEP examine students’ thinking and ways of knowing *in context*. This is particularly valuable as these measures can identify what elements of the learning environment might contribute to developmental change; for example, a specific instructor who challenges students to think about multiple sides of an issue (rather than regurgitate facts on an exam) might be cited as someone who helped move students’ thinking along from a dualistic view to more multiplistic stances. This would certainly be germane for inquiry into the value added of higher education for personal and social responsibility, in that it would provide a sense of effective practices (in this example, the faculty member’s approach).

Thus, the strength of current instrumentation lies in its ability to assess the moral-reasoning dimension of the moral person. Returning once again to Berkowitz’ concept of the moral anatomy, there are few other measurements available to examine other dimensions such as moral behavior, character, values, emotion, and identity. And most of the available instruments—such as those that assess affect, values, behavior, personality, style and interests—have significant limitations to their usefulness in broad-based research on personal and social

responsibility at the college level. Therefore, the principle limitation of available instruments related to personal and social responsibility is as follows: *although the majority of the literature concurs that morality is a multivariate issue, there currently exists the capacity to systematically and significantly examine only a single variable—that of moral cognition.*

A practical illustration of this problem can be found in the Sierra Project, which was discussed earlier. Although the project purported to address multiple dimensions of students' development of personal and social responsibility—among them affect (empathy and perspective taking) and behavior (experiential service learning)—the major instrument used to assess the project was the DIT, and the majority of the project's findings at the time were reported vis-à-vis DIT results (Whiteley and Yokota 1988). In order to assess development in the other dimensions for which the Sierra Project was designed, qualitative interviewing was necessary through a longitudinal study that extended well past students' graduation from college (Whiteley, Yokota, and Associates 1999). With this illustrative example of the limitations of current instrumentation available in mind, the question of directions for future assessment efforts will now be considered.

Assessing Value Added: Future Directions

Colby et al. (2003) state that “for both formal or systematic program assessments and research on moral and civic development and education, instrumentation is a major challenge” (271). Indeed, the limitations facing the assessment of personal and social responsibility at the college level are daunting. And yet, according to Colby et al., such research is critical “in giving educators a better understanding of the development of moral and civic maturity, the kinds of educational experiences that foster it, and the reasons these experiences are important” (273).

The question then becomes what future directions might be most promising for both overcoming current limitations and furthering knowledge and education in the field. Based on findings in the literature, the most promising approach to assessment is one that is *multidimensional*, *multicontextual*, and *multimodal* in nature.

A Multidimensional Approach

It is clear from the literature that an adequate conceptualization of personal and social responsibility necessarily envisions a complex construct involving multiple dimensions of the self. In assessment terms, this means multiple variables need to be considered in any investigation of individual development or educational value added. Along these lines, Wilson (1974) asserts that adequate tests and measurements must “take account of the bewildering variety of variables” (1) inherent in the moral person. However, much like the theoretical landscape that gave birth to them, existing instruments are generally fragmented into measures of single dimensions. And just as an integrated approach is currently needed in theory building for personal and social responsibility, a multidimensional approach is warranted in assessment efforts as well.

Given the current state of instrumentation in the field, two options for crafting a multidimensional approach are immediately apparent. First, since existing instruments are one-dimensional, entirely new instruments can be designed to assess multiple dimensions of the moral self. Certainly, a well-constructed test that provides reliable and valid data on moral cognition, affect, behavior, and other variables—and perhaps even the relationship between them—would be an ideal solution. Attempting to develop new instruments is a problematic enterprise, however, as Colby et al. (2003) explain:

[There] is the misguided assumption that each campus or assessment effort must invent its own instruments de novo. Instrument development and validation are extremely difficult, and few projects are in a position to do them well. Furthermore, when different studies use different instruments, it is very difficult to integrate the findings across the field (271).

In addition to these problems, the time and effort needed to establish validity and reliability—as well as cross-cultural relevance—for new instruments is prohibitive.

A second option is for assessment programs to use several existing measures—each assessing a different dimension—together; for example, if a program purports to support the development of moral cognition and affect, one or more instruments that assess each dimension can be used in tandem. Wilson (1973) provides support for this kind of approach:

[T]he *cumulative* nature of the components necessitates that many of these forms be applied *to the same* [subjects]. We need to know, for the same [subject], that he has the concept of a person, *and* claims it as his moral principle, *and* brings it to bear when making decisions, *and* acts on it. Not only the conceptual links between the components, but also the presence or absence of each in respect of [subject]’s decisions and actions, requires study of the same [subjects] by various methods (82).

While this approach might provide a fuller description of individuals’ development, partnering of instruments that assess different moral dimensions should be done cautiously and judiciously. Measures should be carefully selected for their pertinence to the outcomes under study. To this end, Colby et al. (2003) also warn against “the temptation to use a standardized measure that is not quite appropriate in order to avoid costly investment in instrument development” (271). This is particularly true for those dimensions other than cognitive-structural for which adequate and pertinent measures have not been fully developed; although a caveat against test development was issued earlier, there may be no choice but to design instruments assessing these dimensions (or at the least, to ensure that such dimensions are adequately addressed in qualitative approaches accompanying any quantitative instrumentation). Furthermore, conclusions from

results of an integrative approach should be tentatively stated until they are validated by additional research, in order to avoid claiming relationships between moral dimensions where they do not exist.

As discussed, one of the most pressing questions in the literature is how the dimensions of the moral self—whether cognition, affect, or others—are related to moral behavior. Future development of assessments related to personal and social responsibility will allow for opportunities to explore this question. One promising approach to understanding and assessing moral action is found in what Mentkowski and Associates (2000) describe as the domain of student “performance.” Rather than being comprised of a specified set of competencies or behaviors, performance connotes “effective and dynamic action in a situational context” and “integrates the whole dynamic nexus of a learner’s intentions, thoughts, feelings, and construals into a dynamic and enduring line of action” (146). A specific type of qualitative assessment used at Alverno College, behavioral event interviewing, assesses alumnae performance through questions that elicit descriptions of real performance situations in alumnae’s experiences; responses are coded for a range of cognitive abilities, as well as moral capacities like “reflective valuing” and “accurate empathy,” which are linked to elements of the college’s curriculum and pedagogy. This conceptual approach to and assessment of individual action is representative of integrative and situated work that, ultimately, may yield understanding of how moral behavior is related to multiple dimensions of the moral self.

Determining which instruments to use in assessing personal and social responsibility in college—as well as how to use them conjointly—constitutes a critical area for research in and of itself. Along these lines, Colby et al. describe the “need for a *shareable toolkit* that includes a wide array of valid measures of important dimensions of moral and civic development” (271).

Such a “toolkit” for broad examination of personal and social responsibility represents perhaps the most promising direction for assessment efforts that are multidimensional in nature.

A Multicontextual Approach

One of the most valuable contributions of the social learning perspective is its view of the individual’s interaction with the environment as the foremost process by which the moral self develops. This perspective has not been prevalent in research in higher education, however; the majority of approaches utilized—such as the cognitive-structural perspective—focus primarily on the development of individual capacities (e.g., cognition), with secondary consideration given to environments only insofar as they promote individual development. Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) describe this problem and its relevance to future research:

[G]reater attention in the preparation of research studies needs to be given to bodies of theory and evidence in fields not always reflected in past and present studies. This need is particularly acute in studies of students’ noncognitive, psychosocial changes. . . . Whether many of the observed changes are due to developmental, psychosocial restructuring within students or to the learning, through the socialization process, of competencies, attitudes, values, and behaviors valued by important others remains very much an open and vital question (633).

Thus, social learning theory’s emphasis on the role of environments and constituencies points to the need for a multicontextual approach in research design. The importance of contexts is substantiated by convincing studies of the mitigating effects of honor codes on academic dishonesty. As mentioned earlier, Cole and McCabe (1996) explain that honor codes are typically indicative of a campus culture that not only transmits its value of academic honesty to students, but also involves peers and faculty in reinforcing this value. Thus, research on academic dishonesty and honor codes demonstrates the impact campus cultures and constituencies can have on students’ moral behavior and possibly moral values.

In turn, these findings support integrating an examination of multiple contexts (e.g., institution, classroom, residence hall, peer group, student organizations) with the traditional focus on dimensions of the moral self. Such an approach would likely entail the development of instruments to assess campuses' moral climates, as well as measures to investigate students' perceptions of the moral contexts of which they are a part. Thus, a promising direction for future assessment involves consideration of both the individual's developmental context and the environmental contexts in which the individual is situated—an approach that is multicontextual in nature.

A Multimodal Approach

As described earlier, an array of instruments has been utilized to assess personal and social responsibility at the college level. Wilson (1973) argues for capitalizing on this diversity by employing multiple types of instruments to assess the moral self:

[T]he wide variety of assessments needed demands a particular type of strategy. It will already be evident that we are here concerned with far more than one particular form of assessment or test. The [moral] components are such that pencil-and-paper tests, interviews, check-lists, behavioural observation, practical experiment, simulation-situations and many other forms are required (82).

Such a multimodal approach involves using multiple measures with differing characteristics: subject-provided or performance-related data; quantitative or qualitative nature; and short-term or longitudinal administration.

Relying on subject-provided data has been the hallmark of assessments of cognitive-structural development as well as of other perspectives. Perry (1999) explains that the ways a person makes meaning of experience can “be deduced by others from the forms of his behavior, including, *especially, what he himself has to say on the matter*” (46, emphasis added). Perry's

notion that the process of making meaning can be authentically conveyed by the individual supports the centrality of subject-provided data in research on personal and social responsibility. Indeed, this is the premise behind the majority of instruments utilized in assessing the moral dimensions at the college level.

Although this is the principal type of assessment used, it should be noted that a few institutions have achieved success with data obtained through external observation and judging of student performance. A key example is that of Alverno College, which employs an outcomes-based approach in its curricular design and graduation requirements. Colby et al. (2003) describe Alverno's procedures for assessing students' performance and learning in this curriculum:

Alverno, which does not use grades, has been a leader in arguing that traditional testing is not adequate. . . . Instead, it uses a multidimensional process in which active student performances are observed and judged on the basis of public, developmental criteria. . . . Students are evaluated by a trained outside panel and also assess themselves on their abilities to do the following things: take a position, consider alternative ideas (show awareness of multiple perspectives), contribute to group problem solving, communicate with an awareness of their audience, think through and organize ideas, define problems and plan for solutions, and formulate appropriate action (261).

Alverno may therefore be said to use a "both/and" approach to assessment, as students' learning and development is assessed by both the student and outside reviewers. Along these lines, Alverno does require papers and other traditional work of students, but the school also mandates the development of comprehensive portfolios (housed online) that document student learning throughout the entire college experience. Thus, future assessment efforts in the field might consider adding observation and evaluation of student performance to the more widely used instruments that rely on analysis of subject-provided data.

An additional consideration for assessment efforts is the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. Unlike many other fields of study, the cognitive-structural perspective has

happily generated a good number of both quantitative and qualitative measures to assess moral development. However, as discussed earlier, the quantitative measures from this repertoire have historically been used more extensively. For future efforts at assessment, Colby et al. (2003) advocate the use of “high-yield” as opposed to “low-yield” measures. The authors describe “high-yield” assessments as follows:

Systematic assessment of programs intended to foster moral and civic development can lead to significant program improvement as well as deepening educators’ understanding of what works and why, what it means when something is said to “work,” and even how educators conceive of moral and civic development. But in order for assessment to accomplish these things, it is essential that educators use descriptive, often qualitative methods to look at the processes through which the program operates, the nature of students’ experiences, and the changes students undergo (268).

In contrast, “low-yield” assessments are often not as descriptive, and therefore do not provide the same depth and range of information:

[A]ssessments that examine a few outcome measures and do not look closely at the process underlying the program’s operation cannot say much about the nature of the program, the specific experiences of participating students, the processes that may be operative, and the nature of changes the students may undergo. This is especially true when assessments rely on outcomes measures that are highly condensed indicators of an underlying dimension, often standardized measures that are chosen for convenience or economy of use (268).

Clearly, then, an assessment effort that primarily employs “high-yield” measures is preferable to one that relies solely on “low-yield” instruments. This does not automatically mean, however, that qualitative measures are always preferable over quantitative. Rather, a mixed paradigm may be the most promising in terms of gathering both broad *and* in-depth data on the multiple dimensions of personal and social responsibility.

A final consideration for assessment efforts involves the duration of use of instrumentation in research. Because of the complexity of the phenomena, treatments, and

contexts under investigation, a single point or pre-/post-test design for data collection may very easily miss important transitions and stages in students' development over the college years. Similarly, a cross-sectional study by itself is undesirable as it does not allow for observation of change in students with particular profiles or constellations of the moral dimensions. The most promising approach appears to be longitudinal in nature, with multiple points of data collection for the same students. Assessment efforts may even be extended to examine graduates' retrospective views of their experiences as well as the duration of treatment effects. An example of a longitudinal study that assessed students both in college and after graduation is the Sierra Project (Whiteley, Yokota, and Associates 1999), in which findings from interviews with graduates revealed new perspectives on both the immediate and enduring impact of the project on student development. Longitudinal studies, although certainly time and resource consuming, are important in a multimodal approach to assessing personal and social responsibility in college.

Conclusion:

Future Directions for Research

It is clear from the literature on personal and social responsibility in college that much work is still needed in the three areas—moving toward a shared definition, educating for responsibility, and assessing value added—examined in this review. These three areas, or themes, essentially involve theory building, practice considerations, and assessment methods, respectively. Any prospective research project could have as its focus just one of these themes; however, in an ideal scenario, a comprehensive research strategy would have as its goal the advancement of all three. The question, then, becomes what formulations for future research promise to be most generative for this goal.

Two specific research paradigms appear to have the potential to contribute to all three thematic areas. The first, an *exploratory paradigm*, would involve selecting a single or multiple institutions and conducting descriptive research on existing educational approaches for personal and social responsibility. The second, an *experimental paradigm*, would entail designing, implementing, and assessing an educational intervention at a single or multiple institutions. Consideration of the current state of the field suggests, however, that it is not yet feasible to employ an experimental paradigm in broad-based research on personal and social responsibility at the college level. A review of the literature substantiates the argument that not enough is yet known about the moral self and moral contexts to begin designing comprehensive treatment programs for experimental research. Without at least a working knowledge of these dimensions and contexts, and the relationships between them, it is difficult if not impossible to hypothesize

about the effects a given educational intervention will have on students' development. Along these lines, Wilson (1974), though writing three decades ago, remarked:

[N]obody is yet in a position to conduct anything like a strictly experimental study of the moral effects of what is done in institutions of higher education. . . . However, we are now a good deal clearer both about the *aims* of higher education and about the *kinds* of psychological and social factors—admittedly very general—which are relevant to the efficacy of practical methods. . . . [These are] at least a good candidate for investigation and discussion. We find ourselves therefore in what we might call the pre-experimental stage of investigation (2).

In light of more current literature discussed in this review, it is clear that the field has not progressed significantly from this point over the past thirty years. In general, the same disconnect persists in understanding the relationships of various dimensions of the moral self, and (not surprisingly, therefore) univariate instrumentation is still largely used to assess these dimensions in relative isolation. From a more recent vantage point, Schrader (1999) asserts that current “research enterprises stem from different paradigms and speak different languages” and will continue to do so “until we as moral researchers can construct a new way of examining the field that transcends our current perspective on it” (52).

An exploratory paradigm has significant promise for advancing this current state of affairs. Such a paradigm—given its goals of description and understanding—would be well-suited to investigating enduring gaps in theory, understanding the impact of educational efforts, and testing the applicability of existing and future instrumentation. Exploratory research would thereby provide an important first step in developing a knowledge base for educational design, which can in turn be tested and validated through experimental conditions. Morrill (1980) outlines this sequencing of research and educational design: “When we understand more fully what it means for the unified human person—not a mind in a body, or an organism in an

environment—to be the subject of education, *then* the full possibilities of moral and values education will be manifest” (54-55, emphasis added).

Moving beyond the question of general research paradigms to specific designs, future research efforts should be multidimensional, multicontextual, and multimodal in nature. As such, they would likely involve significant refinement and/or development of instrumentation. An unexamined question to this point, however, is how to identify institutions for participation in such research. It would be ideal to select institutions that have established and recognized approaches in place for educating for personal and social responsibility, so that researchers might have the opportunity to examine the impact of specific educational strategies as well as the general effects of college attendance. One possibility is to consider sampling some or all of the twelve institutions studied by Colby et al. (2003), which they describe as “building moral and civic education into the heart of their undergraduates’ learning” (49). Additionally, the authors note that almost half of the institutions they studied were also named as part of AAC&U’s Greater Expectations Consortium on Quality Education. These institutions are cited for their best practices in enhancing personal and social responsibility, yet according to Colby et al., the potential for (and inherent in) assessment of these practices has not yet been tapped:

At most of the institutions we reviewed, however, programs addressing moral and civic development were not assessed at all. Although we recognize how difficult such assessment is, we believe that more systematic efforts to assess program effectiveness would be worth the considerable investment they require. The development of instruments and methods and the careful documentation of courses and programs, along with empirical research on different modes of moral and civic education, would yield more effective program design, better understanding of what works for which students, increased communication among educators so they could build on each other’s work, and more useful feedback to students and thus more reliable learning (275).

A future research project could be designed to seize upon this opportunity at the institutions already identified in the literature as paradigmatic, as well as the promise such research has for generating these multiple, prospective insights.

Regardless of specific formulations of future research at the college level, one guiding principle is readily evident from the literature: personal and social responsibility can no longer be viewed as a simplistic, one-dimensional, or discrete construct. Schrader (1999) eloquently discusses this point in the context of students' lived moral lives:

[W]e must begin to look at morality as a kaleidoscope in which the various issues, norms, elements, considerations, voices, or perspectives can be seen working together, ever changing, complementing each other, and providing a more complete view of the thoughts and actions of people as they struggle with moral issues in all their complexity (45).

Those who will design future efforts for enhancing personal and social responsibility are themselves responsible for recognizing and embracing this complexity, as well as its full implications for theory, practice, and assessment in the field.

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